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JUDGING JUDGES:  
EMPATHY AS THE LITMUS TEST FOR IMPARTIALITY 
Rebecca K. Lee∗ 
This Article examines the role of empathy in judging, which has been 
directly raised and questioned in recent years, in light of the discussion 
surrounding judicial nominations and appointments to the Supreme 
Court.  President Barack Obama was right to emphasize that empathy is 
an important quality to be found in a judicial nominee, but his public 
support for empathetic judging was unfortunately cut short due to the 
political controversy and misunderstanding surrounding what empathy 
means.  The opportunity remains, however, for a renewed discussion 
regarding judicial empathy by expressly connecting it to our vision of 
judicial impartiality.  This Article makes an affirmative case for 
empathetic decisionmaking and argues that empathetic judging is 
necessary for objective adjudication.  Consequently, when evaluating 
judicial candidates and judges, their exercise of empathy should be used 
as a litmus test to determine whether they will or do engage in impartial 
decisionmaking.  Such a test would recognize that judges have their own 
tendencies in how they view various types of cases and with which party 
they tend to identify.  This tendency particularly matters in cases that 
raise questions of inequality and perspective, and also involve a highly 
factual inquiry in applying the law, such as employment discrimination 
cases.  These cases importantly depend upon how the judge hears the 
litigants’ stories.  Further, since many workplace discrimination suits 
do not make it to a jury and instead are decided solely by the judge on 
summary judgment, it is imperative that judges fully consider each 
party’s side with empathic effort.  To illustrate, this Article examines 
case examples in the employment discrimination context and concludes 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
What does it mean for a judge to be impartial when deciding cases, 
and how can impartiality be assessed?  It is well-established and 
uncontroversial to say that judges must decide cases objectively to be 
fair.  Impartiality is a central tenet of judicial decisionmaking.  It is 
apparently controversial, however, to say that judges must also be 
empathetic;1 the use of empathy has been mischaracterized as something 
that undermines the impartial and detached ideal of judging.2  This issue 
has been directly raised and questioned on the national stage in recent 
 
 1. See discussion infra Part III.A.  See also Robin West, The Anti-Empathic Turn, in PASSIONS 
AND EMOTIONS 243, 244, 246 (James E. Fleming ed., 2012) (pointing out that the notion of empathy in 
judging, a familiar and basic concept during much of the twentieth and nineteenth centuries, has become 
tainted in the last decade during Supreme Court confirmation hearings). 
 2. See id. at 246.  See also Mary Anne Franks, Lies, Damned Lies, and Judicial Empathy, 51 
WASHBURN L. J. 61, 61–62 (2011) (noting that “judicial empathy and judicial impartiality were 
presented as polar opposites” in the aftermath of President Obama’s comments concerning the value of 
empathy in a Justice and pointing out that empathy and impartiality are not mutually exclusive).   
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years, prompted by certain remarks made by President Barack Obama, 
first as Senator and presidential candidate and then as President, 
regarding the empathic qualities he would look for in a judicial nominee, 
including a nominee for the U.S. Supreme Court.3  Critics skeptical of 
the use of empathy charged that empathetic judging would mean 
emotional judging and irrational judging, and they believed it would 
lead to favoritism for one side over another.4  Despite the dissenters, 
President Obama recognized that empathetic judges would better 
understand the range of perspectives and conflicts brought before them.5  
But his public support for empathy was unfortunately short-lived, it 
seems due to resistance in the Senate and the political necessity of 
needing Senate approval for federal court nominations.  Obama thus 
stopped short of making empathic ability a clear and continuous 
requirement to be nominated for a federal judgeship, and the Senate 
failed to give empathy a positive place in the judicial confirmation 
process.   
The discussion, however, should not end here.  And with Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor’s recently published memoir, in which she talks about 
her own efforts in using empathy in various areas of her life, the topic 
has once again been brought to the surface, this time by a sitting 
Supreme Court Justice.6  In further support of judicial empathy, Justice 
Stephen Breyer in a recent interview also used the term “empathy” to 
refer to a “crucial quality [to have] in a judge.”7  Empathy in judging 
matters, and for good reason.8  We must renew our vision of judicial 
empathy by expressly linking it to other requirements for judicial office, 
 
 3. See, e.g., Joseph Williams, Obama May Break with Tradition for High Court Pick; 
Retirement of Souter Opens Opportunities, BOSTON GLOBE, May 2, 2009, 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/05/02/obama_may_break_with_tradition
_for_high_court_pick/; Alec MacGillis, Obama Expands on Criteria for New Justice, WASH. POST, 
May 24, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-05-24/news/36782429_1_common-touch-
common-sense-federal-appeals-court.  See also discussion infra Part III.A.   
 4. See discussion infra Part III.A.   
 5. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 3; MacGillis, supra note 3.  See also discussion infra Part 
III.A.   
 6. See generally SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD (2013) (sharing aspects of her life 
story and career that show her ability to see the world through the eyes of others, to listen to and learn 
from others, and to feel their pain). 
 7. Ioanna Kohler, On Reading Proust: Justice Stephen Breyer, interviewed by Ioanna Kohler, 
N.Y. Rev. of Books, Nov. 7, 2013, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/ 
2013/nov/07/reading-proust/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2013) (“this empathy, this ability to envision the 
practical consequences on one’s contemporaries of a law or a legal decision, seems to me to [be] a 
crucial quality in a judge”). 
 8. See generally Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1944 
(2012) (offering a scholarly defense of President Obama’s call for judicial empathy by looking at the 
differences between empathy and umpiring and between empathy and sympathy, and how empathy 
contributes to good and impartial judging).   
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and by extension, expressly require empathy as a qualification for the 
work of judging.  This Article makes an affirmative case for empathic 
ability as an important criterion in judicial selection and evaluation in 
order to further judicial impartiality.9  Rather than suppress empathy in 
adjudication, judges ought to develop their capacity for empathy in 
order to truly engage in evenhanded and thorough decisionmaking.  
Judicial empathy would not only improve the process of adjudication, 
but is indeed required for judging to be impartial.   
Contrary to the often expressed view that empathy means swift or 
targeted sympathy for a certain side or type of litigant, especially for the 
side that most resembles the adjudicator, or most shares the 
adjudicator’s own experiences or beliefs, empathy should be thought of 
as an effort to understand, as much as possible, the perspectives of 
others, especially others who are different from the jurist in some way 
that is relevant to the dispute.10  Without the use of empathy in judging, 
it is more likely that judges will gravitate, unconsciously or nearly 
automatically, toward the claims of parties more familiar to them and 
more similar to the way they perceive the world.  Judges, relying on 
their own assumptions and experiences, may too easily favor the more 
familiar story without aiming to better understand the situation of the 
less familiar party, and in this way exhibit partiality toward one side.  As 
a result, judges may not seek to fully learn about and fully comprehend 
the situation of each of the litigants in the dispute and all that is at stake.  
In order to truly maintain objectivity in adjudication, the court must use 
a process of empathizing to fully consider the views of all parties who 
come before it.  
Judges are already shaped and influenced by their past experiences—
experiences and observations stemming from their upbringing, their 
schooling, their previous legal careers, and so on.11  Admittedly, then, 
we cannot expect judges to entirely jettison all of their biases and 
perspectives about the world upon stepping into their judicial roles 
because meeting such a standard would be a super-human feat.12  But we 
can and should expect judges to be mindful of their inclinations and use 
conscious effort when hearing different views and different stories.  
Judges, like everyone else, have their own tendencies concerning how 
 
 9. I have previously examined the importance of empathy for effective leadership in 
organizational settings made up of diverse groups, and argued that empathetic leadership is needed to 
advance a culture of core diversity and substantive equality.  See generally Rebecca K. Lee, 
Implementing Grutter’s Diversity Rationale: Diversity and Empathy in Leadership, 19 DUKE J. GENDER 
L. & POL’Y 133 (2011). 
 10. See discussion infra Parts II.B and III.A. 
 11. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 12. See The Honorable Diane S. Sykes, Gender and Judging, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1381, 1388 
(2011).  Judge Sykes is a federal appellate judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
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they view various types of cases, with which party they tend to identify, 
and whose claims more easily resonate with them, both cognitively and 
emotionally.  This tendency matters when deciding cases that involve 
claims of competing perspectives and entail a highly factual inquiry in 
applying the law, such as employment discrimination cases.  These 
cases often largely depend on how the judge sees the facts,13 and 
therefore judges frequently disagree on the outcome in such cases.14  
Because the facts involve more than one story, judges must hear all of 
the stories carefully to be able to weigh one story against another.  
Further, many workplace discrimination suits do not find their way to a 
jury and instead are decided solely by the judge on summary 
judgment,15 rendering it imperative for jurists to give thorough 
consideration to the parties’ accounts.   
To fully uphold the ideal of judicial impartiality, this Article asserts 
that judges ought to develop their ability to empathize as a necessary 
component of the work of judging.  Under this view, judicial 
impartiality requires judicial empathy in order to give equal and 
objective consideration to the claims of the disputant whose lived 
experience differs the most from that of the adjudicator.16  This sort of 
empathizing is necessary to deal with any unconscious bias that a judge 
may hold against the litigant she least identifies with.17  Judges are an 
elite group in many respects, and as such they may find it easier to relate 
to the advantaged party’s view of the dispute.  Judges may identify less 
with outsider perspectives and therefore must especially attend to the 
perspective of the disadvantaged side.18  If judges are to exercise 
 
 13. In cases where the jury acts as the fact finder, it would matter how the judge uses empathy in 
instructing the jury.  But since many employment discrimination cases have to first survive the summary 
judgment hurdle in order to even proceed to trial, the judge, at the summary judgment stage, must aim to 
fully understand the facts from both sides in deciding whether there remain any genuine issues of 
material fact. 
 14. See Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, 
Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 338–39 (2012) (reporting the results 
of an empirical study using data from a large random sample of federal district court filings of 
employment civil rights cases between 1988–2003 in 7 cities: Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, New Orleans, 
New York City, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, and finding that white judges ruled for the defendant 
employer on a motion for summary judgment in 61% of cases while minority judges did the same in 
only 38% of cases, and that this difference is statistically significant). 
 15. Id. at 331–32 (finding that only 100 out of 1,672 cases made it to trial).   
 16. See id. at 324 (defining “empathy” as “the world views of judges that are formed, at least in 
part, by the social location they occupy” and arguing that empathy matters in cases that are “emotionally 
charged and morally consequential,” such as employment civil rights cases). 
 17. But see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC 
LIFE 90 (1995) (contending that “though empathy with the actors will usually be one important part of 
the process of judicious spectatorship, through which the judge takes the measure of the suffering of the 
people[,] [t]he judicious spectator must go beyond empathy, assessing from her own spectatorial 
viewpoint the meaning of those sufferings and their implications for the lives involved”). 
 18. See Catherine Gage O’Grady, Empathy and Perspective in Judging: The Honorable William 
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objectivity when hearing the claims of historically disfavored parties, 
they must take care to put more thought into considering these parties’ 
claims and to place their accounts on equal footing with the accounts of 
the more powerful and privileged party.19   
Part II of this Article discusses the relevance of emotions to legal 
decisionmaking and situates empathy within this discussion, 
demonstrating that the ability to empathize is an essential skill for 
impartial judging.  Part III looks at how we might cultivate a more 
empathic judiciary and how diversity on the bench could support this 
effort.  Part IV examines cases in the employment discrimination 
context to illustrate judicial partiality or impartiality in understanding 
and resolving a dispute, depending on the extent to which the presiding 
judges deployed empathy in deciding the case.  Finally, Part V 
recommends several proposals that would better ensure that judges 
conduct an impartial review of cases with empathic effort and skill. 
II. EMOTIONS, EMPATHY, AND LEGAL DECISIONMAKING 
Empathy consists of mental and emotional components, both of 
which are relevant to legal decisionmaking.20  Although emotions, 
broadly speaking, have been popularly described as being incompatible 
with reason, and especially viewed as incompatible with legal reasoning, 
scholars studying law and emotions have demonstrated that emotions 
are in fact manifested in both feeling and thinking.21  Emotional and 
rational responses are not separate forces but represent largely 
overlapping spheres of ways to process information.22  Given that 
emotions contribute to the way in which one sees and feels about 
something, this perceiving aspect of emotions is important.23  
Challenging, then, the long-held conception of legal reasoning as a 
purely rational process, researchers have shown that emotions inevitably 
influence legal players and the decisions they produce, even if legal 
players choose not to acknowledge this, and moreover that emotions 
 
C. Canby, Jr., 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 4, 5–6 (2001). 
 19. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 86–87. 
 20. See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1592 (1987). 
 21. See generally Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1997 (2010).  See also Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia 
Sotomayor, To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 40 (2009) (statement of Senator Tom Coburn) (“Aristotle defined law as 
‘reason free from passion’”); NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 60; Franks, supra note 2, at 65; David 
Brooks, The New Humanism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/03/08/opinion/08brooks.html. 
 22. Abrams & Keren, supra note 21, at 1999–2000.  See also Brooks, supra note 21. 
 23. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 60–61. 
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should be both acknowledged and relied upon to improve legal 
decisionmaking.24  But there is a continuing belief that legal processes 
must remain mostly unaffected by affective elements,25 even while 
recognizing that emotions should play some part in the deliberative 
process.  This Article examines the role of empathy in particular within 
the field of law and emotions, and argues unreservedly for a particular 
understanding of empathy as essential to the task of impartial judging.   
A. Defining Empathy 
Although it has been commonly characterized as an emotional 
response that percolates in “the heart,”26 empathy actually involves 
much mental skill and openness, as well as feeling.27  Empathy has been 
defined in a number of ways, from the psychological to the cognitive 
neuroscience literature.28  An examination of law and emotions, 
including the study of empathy, has emerged in recent decades, adding 
to our understanding of emotions as they relate to the law.29  Generally 
 
 24. See, e.g., id. at 60; Henderson, supra note 20, at 1574; THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes 
ed., 1999); Abrams & Keren, supra note 21, at 2000.  Emotional intelligence has also been recognized 
as important for successful lawyering.  Jan Salisbury, Emotional Intelligence in Law Practice, 53 THE 
ADVOCATE 38 (2010). 
 25. See, e.g., Ellen Waldman, Mindfulness, Emotions, and Ethics: The Right Stuff?, 10 NEV. L.J. 
513, 514 (2010) (stating that “[i]n the mediation world, scholars and practitioners frequently treat 
emotion as the unruly step-child of the problem-solving mind. . . .  [L]eading mediation theorists present 
emotion as a force to be blunted, manipulated, or leveraged in the service of ‘getting to yes’”) (citations 
omitted).  See also Leonard L. Riskin, Further Beyond Reason: Emotions, the Core Concerns, and 
Mindfulness in Negotiation, 10 NEV. L.J. 289 (2010) (depicting emotion as something that can derail 
negotiations and advocating for mindful awareness to contain the influence of negative emotions). 
 26. See Dahlia Lithwick, Book Review: ‘My Beloved World’ by Sonia Sotomayor, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 11, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book-review-my-beloved-world-by-sonia-
sotomayor/2013/01/11/7a93dcd6-55cd-11e2-bf3e-76c0a789346f_story.html (describing Justice 
Sotomayor’s memoir as “a powerful brief in defense of empathy, her long awaited closing argument in 
the trial of Mind v. Heart”); Peter Slevin, Obama Makes Empathy a Requirement for Court, WASH. 
POST, May 13, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/05/12/AR20090512 
03515.html?sid=ST2009051203561 (referring to Obama’s comments in 2007, when he said that in 
“those 5 percent of [Supreme Court] cases that really count . . . what you’ve got to look at is: [w]hat is 
in the justice’s heart?”). 
 27. See Lian T. Rameson et al., The Neural Correlates of Empathy: Experience, Automaticity, 
and Prosocial Behavior, 24 J. OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 235, 235 (2011); Jean Decety & Philip L. 
Jackson, The Functional Architecture of Human Empathy, 3 BEHAVIORAL AND COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE REVIEWS 71, 73 (2004) (“[E]mpathy requires both the ability to share the emotional 
experience of the other person (affective component) and an understanding of the other person’s 
experience (cognitive component).”). 
 28. See, e.g., Nancy Eisenberg & Janet Strayer, Critical Issues in the Study of Empathy, in 
EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 3, 3–11 (Nancy Eisenberg & Janet Strayer eds., 1987); Decety & 
Jackson, supra note 27, at 73–75. 
 29. See generally Henderson, supra note 20; THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 24; Abrams & 
Keren, supra note 22.  But see Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: 
New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2107–08 (1989) (arguing that empathy has more 
7
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situated within the broader realm of emotions, empathy is in one sense a 
form of emotion, but contrary to public perception, it is not at odds with 
rationality and reason.30  Rather, empathy is also a form of cognitive 
understanding;31 that is, empathy is an expression of both thought and 
emotion.32   
Consistent with this understanding, “empathy” as used in this Article 
refers to our capacity to better comprehend—through both knowledge 
and feeling—another’s perspective by trying to view the world from that 
person’s position, rather than simply observing another’s position from 
where we stand.33  While individuals may draw upon their own 
experiences in empathizing with others, I argue that a thick use of 
empathy entails actively imagining another person’s situation, in an 
attempt to fully consider that person’s experiences in light of her or his 
circumstances.34  Martha Nussbaum has referred to this type of 
empathizing as the “judicial spectator” approach, first described by 
Adam Smith:35 
[T]he [judicious] spectator must . . . endeavor, as much as he can, to put 
 
meaning and application in the area of psychology than law, due to their different purposes). 
 30. Henderson, supra note 20, at 1576. 
 31. See Rameson et al., supra note 27, at 241 (conducting an empirical study and providing 
whole-brain analyses showing that “a relatively consistent set of regions [of the brain] were associated 
with empathic processes,” including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex (DMPFC), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex/subgenual anterior cingulate cortex 
(VMPFC/subACC), the superior temporal sulcus (STS), precuneus, and lateral parietal regions). 
 32. See id. at 235 (“Incorporating the cognitive and emotional talents of humans, empathy 
requires both the ability to comprehend others’ thoughts and feelings as well as resonate affectively with 
their emotions.”); Decety & Jackson, supra note 27, at 73 (“Empathy is a complex form of 
psychological inference in which observation, memory, knowledge, and reasoning are combined to yield 
insights into the thoughts and feelings of others.”).   
 33. See Rameson et al., supra note 27, at 235; Decety & Jackson, supra note 27, at 73 (noting 
that “there is broad agreement on three primary components [of empathy]: (a) an affective response to 
another person, which often, but not always, entails sharing that person’s emotional state; (b) a cognitive 
capacity to take the perspective of the other person; and (c) some regulatory mechanisms that keep track 
of the origins of self- and other-feelings”); Henderson, supra note 20, at 1578–79 (arguing that 
“empathy is a phenomenon that exists to expand understanding of others” and includes “understanding 
the experience or situation of another, both affectively and cognitively, often achieved by imagining 
oneself to be in the position of the other”); BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON 
RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM 66 (2006) (referring to empathy as “a call to stand in somebody 
else’s shoes and see through their eyes”); Colby, supra note 8, at 1958 (referring to empathy as “the 
cognitive skill of perspective taking—the ability to see a situation from someone else’s perspective—
combined with the emotional capacity to understand and feel that person’s emotions in that situation”).   
 34. See Rameson et al., supra note 27, at 242–43 (in an empirical study of empathy-related 
neural activity, finding that the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) region of the brain plays a significant 
role in empathic processes and noting that the MPFC “has been associated with thinking about one’s 
past . . . and possible future experiences . . . two processes pivotal to constructing a window into 
another’s emotional world.  In fact, many participants [in this study] reported recalling similar events 
from their own lives to use as a template for understanding, as well as imagining how they might feel if 
they were in [a specified] situation”). 
 35. NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 72–73. 
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himself in the situation of the other, and to bring home to himself every 
little circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer.  
He must adopt the whole case of his companion with all its minutest 
incidents; and strive to render as perfect as possible, that imaginary 
change of situation upon which his sympathy is founded.36 
Smith, a forefather of contemporary economics, believed that 
rationality and public discourse should be informed by emotion rather 
than be empty of it.37  Applying this concept to the juridical role, a judge 
must imagine the perspective and feelings of each litigant in light of that 
litigant’s circumstances, in order to properly understand and assess the 
dispute involving that party.  It is crucial to consider this information 
because such facts help put each side’s claims into context and fully 
uncover what is at issue.38  This is not a matter of the heart simply 
leading the mind, but rather a matter of using one’s full faculties—
emotional and mental—to comprehend and resolve a difficult 
situation.39  The aim is not to encourage conscious generosity toward 
one side per se, but rather to ensure that a litigant does not unfairly 
benefit from unconscious or automatic credibility simply because a 
judge better understands, or is more familiar with, that party’s story.40  
As Nussbaum points out, the judicious spectator or judge is a spectator 
rather than participant because she is not personally implicated in the 
situation before her; put differently, the judicious spectator has no 
personal stake in the matter.41  But the spectator, as the adjudicator, 
nonetheless is connected to the situation and ought to demonstrate 
concern for those involved in the dispute and how the dispute should be 
resolved.42   
 
 36. Id. at 73 (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759), conceiving 
the idea of the judicious spectator as it pertains to citizenship and public rationality). 
 37. Id. at 72–73. 
 38. But see Thomas Morawetz, Empathy and Judgment, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 517, 529 (1996) 
(reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 
(1996)) (contending that such facts involving “the background, circumstances, and feelings of parties to 
the case . . . are not always relevant”). 
 39. See Rameson et al., supra note 27, at 236 (noting that neurodegenerative disease or lesions in 
empathy-related regions of the brain are associated with empathic deficiencies, and that empathic 
accuracy involves accurate interpersonal judgments); ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: 
EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 3–58 (1994) (recounting the situations of individuals who 
all suffered similar injuries to the brain’s prefrontal cortex and as a result were emotionally impaired 
though cognitively capable, and explaining that the lack of feeling and emotional direction hampered 
their abilities to empathize and make social as well as personal decisions).   
 40. See Morawetz, supra note 38, at 529–30 (arguing that taking into account the background, 
circumstances, and feelings of the parties do not always inspire generosity).   
 41. NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 73. 
 42. Id. at 73.  See generally ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997) [hereinafter WEST, 
CARING FOR JUSTICE] (making the point that judges should show individualized care toward the litigants 
who come before them). 
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From a psychological standpoint, empathy allows us to take a deeper 
glimpse into the lives of others and try to see things as they do.43  While 
the psychologist and judge each have different roles, they both 
nonetheless seek to understand the person in front of them and that 
person’s actions.44  They both receive and rely on information that 
informs the empathic process, albeit in different ways in accordance 
with the setting and norms for each profession.45  Judges, of course, are 
more constrained in terms of time, but as part of their deliberations, they 
can and should engage in empathetic reasoning both in and out of the 
courtroom.46  As former Supreme Court Justice William Brennan has 
said: “ . . . the task of human judgment is not to transcend the self or 
human nature, but to use all helpful aspects of it; not to close off 
reactions but to reflect upon them; not to give in to all intuitions but to 
test them, and then test the tests, against their meanings in the actual 
lives of others.”47 
B. Empathy and Objectivity 
The use of empathy in juridical decisionmaking means trying to 
picture the situations of the parties and their perceptions based on their 
particular experiences, especially from a less privileged viewpoint.48  
Without empathy, people in general tend to view others and the world, 
consciously and unconsciously, from a certain vantage point depending 
on what they are accustomed to and how they are situated in society.49  
Demonstrating empathy thus requires that individuals be cognizant of 
their own predisposed positions, taking into account their race, gender, 
class, and all other relevant considerations that have contributed to their 
specific life and career opportunities.50  Judges, then, must try to step 
 
 43. See Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 14, at 350 (referring to psychological research which 
“consistently shows that empathetic induction helps individuals recognize more nuanced, situational 
narratives that are distinct from their own”).   
 44. But see Massaro, supra note 29, at 2107–08 (pointing out the differences between the 
functions of the mental health counselor and judge). 
 45. But see id. (pointing out the different settings found in law and psychology). 
 46. But see id. (noting the different time limitations in the legal and psychological contexts). 
 47. Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37, 48 
(1988) (discussing William J. Brennan Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law”, 10 
CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 4–5 (1988)). 
 48. See O’Grady, supra note 18, at 5–6 (discussing the judicial approach of Judge William 
Canby, a long-serving appellate judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals). 
 49. See Decety & Jackson, supra note 27, at 84 (stating that “people are fundamentally 
egocentric and have difficulty getting beyond their own perspective when anticipating what others are 
thinking or feeling”); PETER G. NORTHOUSE, LEADERSHIP: THEORY AND PRACTICE 15, 337 (5th ed. 
2010) (stating the universal tendency to engage in ethnocentrism). 
 50. See Chris Chambers Goodman, Retaining Diversity in the Classroom: Strategies for 
Maximizing the Benefits that Flow From a Diverse Student Body, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 663, 669 (2008) 
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outside of their own worlds in order to consider different kinds of 
thinking and experience.51  Particularly since individuals tend to 
empathize more easily, even reflexively, with others like themselves, 
judges are likely to make decisions that disproportionately benefit 
similarly-situated or familiarly-situated parties.52  Stepping into 
another’s world as she or he experiences it means that a judge must 
elicit the information needed to picture oneself in that person’s 
situation.53  Using one’s imagination can help supplement our 
understanding of another’s outlook, and tapping into one’s own 
similarly-lived experiences and feelings can help render the imaginative 
aspect more concrete.54  This process of empathizing provides a way to 
pursue knowledge removed from or outside of oneself, an understanding 
unmoored from one’s own necessarily limited worldview and 
experience.55  It is thus incumbent upon judges to put effort and thought 
into broadening their ability to empathize with those different from 
them, in order to adjudicate impartially and with equal attention to all 
parties.56 
 
(discussing the benefits that come from having diversity on campuses and stating that “the importance 
of developing empathy and understanding involves making students aware of the privileges they 
enjoy”). 
 51. See Decety & Jackson, supra note 27, at 84 (referring to a series of experiments 
demonstrating that “adult subjects exhibit a tendency to infer that others have the same knowledge (and 
beliefs) as they do, even when they are aware that the others have a different point of view”); 
NORTHOUSE, supra note 49, at 337. 
 52. See Henderson, supra note 20, at 1585; Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 14, at 350 (referring 
to research which indicates that individuals display more empathy toward those who are similarly 
situated).  See also Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Empathy and Race Discrimination, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1461, 1464 (2002) (looking at the role of empathy 
in corporate governance and concluding that corporate officers and directors, most of whom are white 
and male, have too much empathy for privileged groups and too little empathy for employees of color, 
preventing them from adequately investigating and monitoring allegations of race discrimination in the 
workplace).  
 53. See Nannerl O. Keohane, On Leadership, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 705, 710 (2005) (citing Hannah 
Arendt’s point that judgment “involves the use of ‘imagination’ and ‘enlarged thought,’ being able to 
put oneself into the situation of someone else”).   
 54. See Henderson, supra note 20, at 1581; Susan A. Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 24 (2011) [hereinafter Bandes, Moral Imagination] (describing moral imagination as 
“the ability to understand one’s own limitations, the limitations of perspective, the range of values at 
stake, and the possibilities for change inherent in the situation”).  Cf. Franks, supra note 2, at 68–69 
(Viewing empathy as “the exercise of our moral imagination against, or at least indifferent to, our own 
self-interest.  Sympathy, by contrast, is the emotion we feel when others remind us of ourselves or of 
situations we have ourselves experienced. . . .  Empathy forces us to imagine and to have concern for 
those who are radically different from, even threatening to, ourselves and our values. . . .  Sympathy is 
easy, as it involves little or no cognitive dissonance, whereas empathy is hard, requiring at least a 
temporary embrace of cognitive dissonance.”). 
 55. See OBAMA, supra note 33, at 68 (remarking that to empathize with others who are different 
from us is to be “forced beyond our limited vision”); Bandes, Moral Imagination, supra note 54, at 24. 
 56. See Sykes, supra note 12, at 1388 (stating that empathy is a judicial virtue because it 
“enables the judge to achieve a better understanding of the parties’ circumstances without being 
11
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The position of judge does not automatically confer a universal 
perspective onto those who adjudicate, and judges must not assume that 
their views are objective simply because they have the privilege of 
issuing them from the bench.57  The regularity with which judges 
disagree with their colleagues, when dissenting on appeal or when 
overturning a decision below, plainly show that judges do not always, or 
even often, speak with one mind.  Judicial opinions, in a basic sense, 
express just that—the thoughts of a given judge or panel of judges.  But 
their conclusions are consequential and precedential because judicial 
opinions become law.  In light of this weighty responsibility, those 
stepping into a judgeship should approach their decisionmaking with an 
extra measure of humility rather than hubris, and maintain a disposition 
that prompts them to question and reflect rather than assume.58  It is 
widely understood that a central feature of judicial opinion-making is 
judicial impartiality,59 but impartiality will not result unless judges 
acknowledge their own partialities when judging.60  Judges are not blank 
slates but themselves the products, to some degree, of their own 
backgrounds and circumstances.  While judicial biases lie on a 
spectrum, there are jurists who hold firm ideological commitments,61 
 
predisposed toward one side or the other”).   
 57. Senator Jeff Sessions, for instance, made a statement that seemed to assume a judge could be 
clothed with objectivity simply by donning the robe: “The core strength of American law is that a judge 
puts on that robe and he says, ‘I am unbiased; I’m going to call the balls and strikes based on where the 
pitch is placed, not on whose side I’m on.  I don’t take sides in the game.’”  Sessions Says He’s Looking 
for Judicial Restraint, NAT’L JOURNAL (May 7, 2009), http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/ 
sessions-says-he-s-looking-for-judicial-restraint-20090507.  See Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging 
and the Rule of Law, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE•NOVO 133, 139 (2009) [hereinafter Bandes, Empathetic 
Judging]. 
 58. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225 (2009) (noting that “judges might be overconfident about their 
abilities to control their own [racial] biases,” based on data collected from a group of judges at a judicial 
education conference). 
 59. See, e.g., Model Code of Judicial Conduct, at Canon 2 (2008) (“A judge shall perform the 
duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently.”). 
 60. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 58, at 1197, 1207–08, 1221 (discussing the results of a study 
of implicit racial bias among judges and finding that judges, like everyone else, hold implicit biases 
involving race, and that these biases can influence their judgment). 
 61. A particularly notable example is former Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore, who defied a 
federal judge’s order to remove a Ten Commandments monument from the state Supreme Court 
building lobby on constitutional grounds and subsequently was removed from judicial office by the 
state’s judicial ethics panel in 2003.  Ten Commandments Judge Removed from Office, CNN, Nov. 14, 
2003, http://articles.cnn.com/2003-11-13/justice/moore.tencommandments_1_ethics-panel-state-
supreme-court-building-ethics-charges?_s=PM:LAW.  On refusing to remove the religious monument, 
Moore stated that “‘God has chosen this time and this place so we can save our country and save our 
courts for our children.’” Id.  In 2012, Moore was re-elected to the office of state Chief Justice, and 
upon his electoral victory, remarked to his supporters, “‘[g]o home with the knowledge that we are 
going to stand for the acknowledgment of God.’” Kim Chandler, ‘10 Commandments Judge’ Roy Moore 
Wins His Old Job Back, WASH. POST, Nov. 8. 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-
08/national/35505358_1_republican-moore-roy-moore-chief-justice. 
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raising the need for greater empathy to temper these pre-existing and at 
times strong leanings.  Judges must scrutinize their own tendencies and 
assumptions, as well as that of the parties, in striving for juristic 
objectivity.62  Judicial standpoints are not entirely neutral, and, as the 
term suggests, are influenced by where a judge stands (or sits) and the 
experiences she or he has had in getting there.63  Objectivity becomes a 
tricky thing once we see that other, additional and conflicting, 
perspectives exist, and achieving an objective understanding then 
requires recognizing different views and trying each of them on, in order 
to determine which one should prevail in light of all the relevant law and 
facts.64   
To counteract their “subjective starting points,”65 judges must 
consciously seek to maintain a detached stance to overcome their 
partialities in adjudication.  This detachment, however, does not mean 
emotional detachment from the case; on the contrary, engaging one’s 
emotions along with one’s analytical and imaginative abilities in 
understanding the parties’ claims will allow judges to detach themselves 
from their own biases.66  Judges must be careful not to give effect to 
their biases by immediately giving more weight to the arguments of 
those who are more similar in background and circumstance; this type of 
common identification entails little imaginative perspective-taking and 
does not contribute to, but rather takes away from, an impartial review.  
This is especially harmful when such biases exist due to animus or 
hostility toward an unfavored party.67  But even an unintentional lack of 
careful attention to a party’s situation can undermine the objectivity of 
the judicial process. 
This Article asserts that judicial impartiality requires empathy, 
understood as a conscious effort a judge must make to comprehend the 
perspective of another, whose life and situation may differ in various 
ways.  Effortless forms of identification with another, on the other hand, 
 
 62. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 58, at 1221 (based on a study of implicit racial bias among 
judges, finding that judges can counteract the effect of their implicit biases when making decisions if 
they are aware of their biases and try to restrain them). 
 63. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of 
the Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REV. 887, 906 (1987) (“A judge cannot 
be divorced ‘from what he has seen, has heard, has experienced, and has been.’”). 
 64. See Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 14–15 (1987) (questioning 
whether one viewpoint can be objective if multiple viewpoints are possible, and asserting that judges 
should identify and contrast different viewpoints to know which one should govern in a given instance). 
 65. THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 6 (1986). 
 66. See Ericka Rackley, When Hercules Met the Happy Prince: Re-imagining the Judge, 12 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 213, 229–30 (2005) (asserting that a judge can engage in judicial detachment by 
fully letting in the experiences of the litigants). 
 67. See id. at 229 (referring to this as “bad empathy” and noting that “bad empathy not only fails 
as a matter of justice or fairness but also as empathy itself”).   
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amount to simple reaffirmation of one’s own perspective rather than a 
searching empathic inquiry concerning other perspectives.  Developing 
the capacity to empathize, and pursuing judicial objectivity, means that 
judges must “transcend [their] particular viewpoint[s] and develop an 
expanded consciousness that takes in the world more fully.”68   
To be clear, empathy is not results-driven but process-oriented, and in 
this respect, empathy alone does not determine the outcome.69  At the 
same time, incorporating empathy into the decisionmaking process will 
support impartial judgment and better ensure that decisions are just and 
fair.70  Empathic consideration for a litigant does not necessarily mean 
that party will win, but it does mean the judge has carefully thought 
about that side’s claims in light of their human—that is, their real and 
lived—situation.71  And based on the experiences of those who have 
used the judicial system, litigants will have more trust and confidence in 
the courts when judges demonstrate empathic understanding in hearing 
them and evaluating their cases.72 
Additionally, judges cannot judge well using empathy alone: they 
undoubtedly must also have proficiency in understanding and 
interpreting the law.  But the application of legal rules and concepts 
must be grounded in the full range of human experiences to achieve 
impartiality in the law.73  Furthermore, one purpose of the law is to 
shape individual and societal conduct, and to do this judges must expand 
their use of empathy to better understand human behavior in applying 
the law.74  Empathy encourages the judge to take in the human context 
 
 68. See NAGEL, supra note 65, at 5. 
 69. See Rackley, supra note 66, at 228 (understanding empathy “as a process, as opposed to an 
end” but also arguing that empathy can lead to either good or bad judgment); O’Grady, supra note 18, at 
10 (stating that “[e]mpathy in judging is not predictive of outcome—it is part of a process, but it does 
not carry the day”). 
 70. See Minow, supra note 64, at 60 (“The process of looking through other perspectives does 
not itself yield an answer, but it may lead to an answer different from the one that the judge would 
otherwise have reached.”); Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 14, at 350 (asserting that social science 
research can promote greater judicial empathy by helping judges better comprehend their cases).  But 
see Rackley, supra note 66, at 228 (arguing that empathy can lead to either good or bad judgment).   
 71. See O’Grady, supra note 18, at 5–6 (noting that Judge Canby did not always vote in favor of 
the poor or the disenfranchised party, but he always attempted “seriously to appreciate the human 
context of their situation while applying legal rules and principles to the task of deciding their dispute”).   
 72. See LYNN HECHT SCHAFRAN & NORMA J. WIKLER, GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS: 
ACTION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 115 (2001), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/our-
work/vaw/njep-reports-and-resources/gender-fairness-in-courts-millenium.pdf (describing the results of 
the Wisconsin State Bar Public Trust and Confidence Project, which conducted focus groups around the 
state with people who recently had used the courts and found that a common complaint was that the 
courts lacked empathy with the parties). 
 73. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 121 (pointing out that while judges need technical legal 
knowledge, “to be fully rational, judges must also be capable of fancy and sympathy” and “must educate 
not only their technical capacities but also their capacity for humanity”). 
 74. Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 57, at 139. 
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of the litigants’ claims and to carry out the process of adjudication as a 
human rather than as an automaton or solely abstract activity.75 
As adjudication takes place at both the trial and appellate levels, 
empathy should be incorporated at every stage where decisions are 
made.  Although President Obama’s comments and the judicial 
confirmation hearings were focused on federal appellate court nominees, 
all judges—trial and appellate, state and federal—must strive for 
impartiality through the use of empathy.  Trial judges in particular 
commonly serve as the sole audience who hear and decide claims at the 
summary judgment stage—before any possible trial by jury.76  
Consequently, it is critically important that they make an effort to 
envision the plaintiffs’ stories in establishing the factual record and 
bring into view a clearer picture of what is at stake in a given case.  
Precisely because dismissing a case on summary judgment means that 
the plaintiff will not have the opportunity to present their case to a jury, 
the latter being the stage at which empathy more typically comes into 
play,77 the judge must exercise empathy pretrial to properly determine 
whether a trial is merited.  The trial judge’s role and the jury’s role, at 
least with respect to fact-finding, is the same.78  The difference is that a 
judge can make factual findings that would otherwise be made by a 
group of twelve individuals, and in light of this responsibility, the judge 
must consider the parties’ stories through their eyes and through the 
eyes of others, in order to step outside of one’s limited field of view.  
Envisioning the plaintiffs’ stories means fully listening to them and 
bringing out the details they have to share so that their voices are 
included in the judge’s decision and opinion.79   
Appellate judges also must engage in an empathic process of 
 
 75. See Sophie H. Pirie, John T. Noonan as Judge: What Can Empathic Judging Mean for 
Women?, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 541, 550 (1995–96); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Commentary on Jeffrey M. 
Shaman’s The Impartial Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 633, 640–41 (1996).  
Justice Abrahamson is a Justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
 76. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56. 
 77. See, e.g., Janeen Kerper, The Art and Ethics of Jury Selection, 24 AM. J. OF TRIAL 
ADVOCACY 1, 3–5 (2000) (explaining the importance of empathy in selecting jurors for a successful 
trial outcome); Douglas O. Linder, Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV. 887, 911–16 (1996) 
(discussing the risks and benefits of juror empathy in criminal cases and concluding that “empathetic 
juries probably produce better outcomes than would a theoretical objective decision maker”); Martha S. 
West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law’s Failure to Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 
68, 123–24 (1994) (Stating that “[h]istorically, juries have been viewed as more sympathetic to 
employee claims than judges.  In discussing the value of requesting a jury in [Section] 1981 litigation, 
one attorney commented that judges tend to be jaded by their experiences and ‘may have limited 
empathy for victims of race discrimination.’  Jurors, on the other hand, may ‘understand better than 
judges appointed for life the anguish caused by loss of a job’”). 
 78. E.g., Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 68 n.9 (2008) (stating 
that “‘[f]actfinders’ [ ] refers to both judges and juries, but only in their factfinding capacity”). 
 79. See Abrahamson, supra note 75, at 640. 
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understanding since they will render the final decision in a given case on 
appeal.80  But because jurists at the appellate level do not engage in fact-
finding, they need to rely on the factual record below as well as on the 
appellate briefs and oral arguments to help them comprehend the 
parties’ positions.81  Attorneys can aid in the process by telling their 
clients’ stories in a way that helps judges place themselves in the 
litigants’ shoes and envision what it would be like to think and feel from 
the litigants’ perspectives.82  It is therefore advisable for lawyers at 
every stage of litigation to effectively convey their clients’ viewpoints 
and human circumstances in a way that better stirs empathic 
understanding and imagination on the part of judges.83  Judges can look 
to amicus briefs as additional sources of information that provide 
viewpoints offered by those who care about the issues in the litigation 
but who do not appear as parties before the court.84   
Establishing a clearer understanding of empathy and how it 
contributes to impartiality can help address political concerns, with the 
goal of creating both political and judicial support for an empathy-
incorporated approach to judging.85  It is true that “[p]olitics has no 
place in the courtroom,”86 and the vision of empathy described here is 
consistent with this goal by recognizing that judges may have their own 
political or other predispositions, and therefore must use empathy to 
keep their personal leanings in check when deciding cases.  Some might 
say that “empathy” has become too controversial a word to use in 
connection with adjudication, but the concept should not be abandoned 
because of Congress’s and others’ past confusion regarding what 
empathy means and their resulting uneasiness concerning the use of it.  
Rather, the term should be clarified and its direct importance to judicial 
impartiality asserted.  Given the centrality of empathy for objective 
adjudication and the unfinished national dialogue on the question of 
empathy in judging, we must advance the discussion so that empathy 
will be seen as the proper test in assessing impartiality for the role of 
 
 80. O’Grady, supra note 18, at 14. 
 81. Id. at 14–15. 
 82. Minow, supra note 64, at 59 (noting that “Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson may 
have been assisted by Homer Plessy’s attorney, who had urged the Justices to imagine themselves in the 
shoes of a black person”); Colby, supra note 8, at 1982 (stating that “the best lawyers write their legal 
briefs in a manner that seeks to draw empathy from the judge, using the fact section to tell a story that 
helps the judge to see the case from their client’s perspective”).   
 83. O’Grady, supra note 18, at 15. 
 84. Minow, supra note 64, at 88. 
 85. See Colby, supra note 8, at 2006 (“Empathic judging is not liberal judging; it is good 
judging.”) (emphasis added). 
 86. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, To Be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 21, at 7 (statement of Senator Jeff 
Sessions). 
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judge.87   
C. Empathy and Claims of Discrimination and Inequality 
It is important to keep in mind that because most judges are members 
of privileged groups (white, male, straight, able-bodied, affluent, etc.), 
they need to be especially attentive to litigants with less privileged 
backgrounds whose stories may resonate less easily with them than the 
stories of those with whom they share something in common.88  To 
avoid gravitating toward the more familiar account, judges must 
expressly and consciously seek to understand and imagine the 
perspectives of the parties who come before them, especially those with 
less power.89  This is particularly important in cases where the judges 
themselves are differently situated from the parties in terms of life 
opportunities and societal expectations.  Since people tend to more 
easily and even automatically empathize with people like themselves—
for instance, judges will empathize more easily with other judges, whites 
will empathize more easily with other whites, men will more easily 
empathize with other men, the religious majority will more easily 
empathize with others of similar faith—little imagination is needed for 
this type of near-automatic empathizing.90  In fact, we may not want to 
call this kind of relating to others as empathy at all, since it is largely an 
unconscious reaction rather than a conscious perspective-taking.91  
Rather, a thick use of empathy is needed to engage in a conscious 
process of trying to understand others’ experiences from their 
perspectives, using concerted effort, especially when empathizing with 
others who are differently situated in some way from the 
 
 87. Cf., Franks, supra note 2, at 68 (asserting that “[e]mpathy, however defined, is surely not the 
only, or even the key, characteristic of good judging” and that “[g]ood judging is a complex and 
context-sensitive practice, and there is likely no need to make empathy into a judicial meta-value, 
especially given the controversy over its definition,” but also stating that “there is value to the concept 
for those genuinely invested in thinking critically about the judicial process . . . ”). 
 88. See Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 14, at 325–26 (stating that “[w]hether a person is more 
or less empathetic depends on common membership in a social category or group” and that “[o]ften 
these differences are based on race and gender categories”).   
 89. See Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 57, at 141 (noting that the Justices on the U.S. 
Supreme Court often display empathy for powerful litigants, such as corporate defendants and 
government officials).  
 90. See id. (stating that judges frequently show empathy for other judges and government 
officials). 
 91. See Rameson et al., supra note 27, at 240–41 (conducting an empirical study of empathy-
related neural activity and explaining that empathy appears not to be a completely automatic process 
because instructing subjects to intentionally empathize produced more neural activity compared to when 
they were not given the instruction and when they were given a cognitively distracting task while also 
not prompted to empathize). 
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decisionmaker.92  It involves the process of imagining what another 
person thinks and feels in the given situation, and carefully taking this 
into account as part of the factual narrative.93  Without developing their 
ability to explore other views, judges may make unconscious and biased 
judgments based on their personal tendencies and their own life 
experiences.94  Judges who take note of their human impulses and their 
unconscious biases while judging will less likely fall trap to them.95 
Further, jurists should pay greater care to members of traditionally-
subordinated groups, whose viewpoints are less commonly understood 
and given less credit in larger society.96  Such individuals, for instance, 
typically are involved in lawsuits dealing with some sort of alleged 
discrimination or unequal treatment.  While empathy is certainly needed 
for impartial judging generally, it seems particularly necessary in 
discrimination cases where judges’ unconscious biases can cloud the 
decisionmaking process if they do not exercise conscious empathy in 
listening to the traditionally- and socially-subordinated side.97  As 
 
 92. See id. at 242 (analyzing the results of an empirical study on empathy-related neural activity 
and finding that “stronger neural responses were observed when participants were instructed to 
empathize, which suggests top-down effortful cognition may amplify empathic responses”); Decety & 
Jackson, supra note 27, at 84 (“There is plenty of evidence from various disciplines to suggest that the 
mental flexibility to adopt someone else’s point of view is an effortful and controlled process.”). 
 93. See Decety & Jackson, supra note 27, at 84 (describing experiments demonstrating that 
“deliberate acts of imagination produced a greater [empathic] response than just watching [the target 
person in a given situation],” and also showing “the effectiveness of perspective-taking instructions in 
inducing empathy”).   
 94. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1117–38 
(2008) (describing perceptual segregation theory, which describes how outsiders (racial minorities and 
women) view allegations of discrimination differently than do insiders (whites and males).  An extreme 
example of biased judgment can be found in a Maryland case involving a male criminal defendant who 
was sentenced to 18 months in a work release/home detention program for intentionally killing his wife 
three hours after finding her in an act of adultery.  See WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 28.  
Statements made by the judge at the time of sentencing exposed the judge’s “deep sympathy for and 
identification with the defendant, and the judge’s belief that indeed no man, including the judge himself, 
would be able to walk away from the scene he had encountered without ‘inflicting corporal 
punishment.’” Id. 
 95. Abrahamson, supra note 75, at 645 (“As Judge Jerome Frank once warned, those judges 
gullible enough to imagine that they might transcend their human condition are all the more susceptible 
to their own prejudices, which grow stronger because they are unacknowledged and therefore 
unrecognized.”).   
 96. See Robinson, supra note 94, at 1154–55 (referring to an “insider bias” in the enforcement of 
antidiscrimination law under Title VII and noting that racial minorities and women thus are likely to 
view court rulings concerning discrimination as inaccurate and contrary to their life experiences); WEST, 
CARING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 24 (arguing that justice must be caring to succeed as a matter of 
justice, and that caring if not just will also not be caring).   
 97. See O’Grady, supra note 18, at 26–27 (pointing out that empathetic consideration of others’ 
situations seems particularly relevant when assessing cases involving discrimination against 
disadvantaged groups, and that taking into account the parties’ stories in a human sense would help 
judges overcome an unconscious dependence on stereotypical generalizations).  Cf. Colby, supra note 8, 
at 1966–83 (explaining the importance and application of empathic judging to constitutional law cases 
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studies indicate, judges will be more or less inclined to detect 
discriminatory behavior depending on how strongly they identify with a 
socially disfavored group.98  For instance, in cases involving allegations 
of employment discrimination, white judges are more likely to let some 
part of the plaintiff’s case proceed past summary judgment when the 
plaintiff is white than when the plaintiff is a racial minority.99  We have 
seen that judges, including Supreme Court Justices, have been more 
empathetic toward those who share their characteristics, and this 
common form of relating to others typically goes unnoticed and 
undermines a judicially impartial stance.100   
By tapping into their capacity for empathy and imagination, judges 
would be affected less by any initial similarities or differences they may 
have with the parties and encouraged to notice more shared feelings and 
aspirations, as they aim to see disputes through different sets of eyes.101  
Research suggests that one’s level of concern toward others increases 
when commonalities with them, even small ones, are discovered.102  
And finding such commonalities through an empathetic posture would 
help judges identify with the different litigants and their predicaments, 
allowing all sides to benefit from an equal degree of concern.  The use 
of empathy, to be deployed equally and not selectively or automatically, 
must be deliberate.  In light of all this, empathy is not just relevant but 
absolutely necessary for judging to take place in an objective fashion.103  
 
and beyond, including the full spectrum of legal doctrine).   
 98. See Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 14, at 326 (referring to “research that suggests that 
individuals are more or less likely to perceive the presence of discrimination based on their 
identification with a stigmatized social group”).   
 99. Id. at 343 (reporting that “when a white judge decides a case involving a white plaintiff, the 
plaintiff’s case (or some portion of it) has a 40 percent predicted probability of surviving a motion for 
summary judgment” and that “[w]hen a white judge adjudicates a case involving a minority plaintiff, 
however, the predicted probability of the plaintiff’s case surviving summary judgment drops to roughly 
34.43 percent”).   
 100. See Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 57, at 148 (referring to then-Senator Barack 
Obama’s assertion that the current Supreme Court is too one-sided in its empathy); Weinberg & Nielsen, 
supra note 14, at 350 (pointing to research showing that individuals display more empathy toward those 
who are similarly-situated).  See also discussion infra Part IV. 
 101. See WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 89 (explaining that judges must employ 
empathic understanding to be able to look past surface differences and perceive deep commonalities at 
the heart of certain disputes). 
 102. David DeSteno, Compassion Made Easy, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/the-science-of-compassion.html?_r=1&emc=eta1; 
Piercarlo Valdesolo & David DeSteno, Synchrony and the Social Tuning of Compassion, 11 EMOTION 
262, 262–66 (2011), available at http://www.socialemotions.org/page5/files/ 
Valdesolo.DeSteno.2011.pdf (describing a study which found that participants who perceived that they 
shared a trivial similarity with another person (in this case, a motor synchrony in music) were 
subsequently more often motivated to help that person than if they had not perceived this shared 
similarity).  See also Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 14, at 325 (referring to research demonstrating 
that people are more willing to help others if they empathize with them).   
 103. See O’Grady, supra note 18, at 11 (noting that the use of empathy “to acquire knowledge and 
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To paraphrase Martha Minow on the importance of wrestling with 
different perspectives, only by recognizing their partiality can judges 
strive for impartiality.104  
D. Empathy and Maintaining the Appearance of Propriety 
Taking an empathetic approach would help judges not only strive for 
impartiality but also avoid appearances of impropriety that could be 
viewed by some as compromising their impartiality.  When a judge has 
some type of connection to a case over which she is set to preside, she 
must decide whether to recuse herself, a complicated ethical matter that 
judicial disqualification rules do not clearly answer.105  Although the 
judge initially might think the association in question is sufficiently 
impersonal or indirect to justify her taking the case, she may reconsider 
her stance by thinking empathically about how others unfamiliar with 
her activities and connections as a judge would view, and feel about, the 
situation, and through such reflection preserve both the appearance of 
propriety and the appearance of judicial impartiality before the public.   
Without an empathic view of the situation, a judge may fail to see the 
public’s perspective of his extrajudicial activities as they relate to the 
pending dispute, as was the case when Supreme Court Justice Antonin 
Scalia refused to remove himself from a case involving then-Vice 
President Richard Cheney as a named defendant.106  In Cheney v. U.S. 
District Court,107 as the case was pending before the Supreme Court, the 
public learned that Justice Scalia had previously traveled with Vice 
President Cheney on his official plane, Air Force Two, to go duck 
hunting in Louisiana at the invitation of a businessman who organized 
the trip.108  Justice Scalia knew Cheney from their time together working 
for former President Gerald Ford, and the Justice stated simply that both 
he and Cheney enjoyed the activity of duck hunting.109  Scalia did not 
regard it as unusual for judges to socialize with government officials, 
 
enhance understanding is not inconsistent with objective, neutral, and rational judicial 
decisionmaking”). 
 104. See Minow, supra note 64, at 75 (stating that “[o]nly by admitting our partiality can we strive 
for impartiality”).  But Minow does not see this “plea of judges to engage with perspectives that 
challenge their own” as a “call for sympathy or empathy . . . .”  Id. at 77. 
 105. Abrahamson, supra note 75, at 645 (noting that “‘to decide when a judge may not sit is to 
define what a judge is’” and remarking on the lack of clear guidance concerning when judges ought to 
disqualify themselves). 
 106. See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, 
AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 128–30 (2011) (referring to Cheney v. 
U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004)).   
 107. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
 108. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 106, at 129. 
 109. Id.  
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and since he had not discussed matters pertaining to the case during the 
trip, Scalia concluded that no conflict of interest existed to merit his 
recusal.110  His decision, however, went against the public sentiment, 
which challenged his neutrality in hearing the case—in fact, twenty of 
the thirty largest newspapers publicly asked for his recusal.111  Scalia 
failed to maintain an image of impartiality because he failed to use 
empathy in deciding whether he should participate in this particular 
case.  He was not able to see outside his own viewpoint (and the 
viewpoint of others like him who socialize in rarefied circles), thereby 
neglecting to perceive that the larger public would, and did, view his 
activity with Cheney very differently.112  
Judicial impartiality, however, requires more than remaining 
independent from the influence of political, religious, or special interest 
groups, and requires more than remaining disentangled from any 
personal investment in a case.113  Judicial impartiality also calls for a 
consciously balanced approach to considering the claims of litigants so 
as to be equally mindful to all sides.  Without proper attention given to 
each story, judges’ general view of things and experiences may exert 
greater influence on how they hear the facts “[b]ecause no one is 
without perspective.”114 
E. Empathy, Impartiality, and Judicial Blindness 
To engage in empathetic and impartial decisionmaking, the judge 
must take in the specifics of the case, but one might then ask: isn’t 
Justice supposed to be blind?115  Judicial impartiality has been widely 
symbolized through the visual representation of Justice, depicted as a 
woman customarily wearing a blindfold and holding scales.116  The 
blindfold, more so than the scales, has come to be understood as 
preserving neutrality in the adjudication process by preventing the judge 
from seeing the people involved in a case.117  But the bandage can 
arguably have the opposite effect, by encouraging the judge to view the 
case too generally and to improperly compare it to other seemingly 
similar cases that in fact would be evidently dissimilar if the important 
 
 110. Id. at 129–30. 
 111. Id. at 129. 
 112. See id. at 130. 
 113. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 86 (describing judicial neutrality). 
 114. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 106, at 104.  
 115. See id. at 91. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. 
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specifics of each situation could be seen.118  Ironically, the blindfold 
serves to undermine objective and fair judging because it creates an 
obstacle to seeing all of the pertinent information that would support full 
empathic decisionmaking.119  The blindfold therefore must be shed to 
allow the judge to see, imagine, and know the particular stakes for the 
parties in the dispute.120  Just as Justice’s blindfold should be cast aside, 
the litigants should also be seen unmasked so that the judge can take 
into account their circumstances and perspectives based on their specific 
characteristics.121  The need for judicial sight and consideration of 
context is even more critical in light of the historical inequities and 
exclusion of individuals based on race, ethnicity, gender, and so on, in 
larger society and in the judicial system.122   
The notion of a blind Justice also resembles the notion of a “color-
blind” Constitution, as articulated by Justice John Marshall Harlan in his 
dissent in the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson,123 with the understanding 
that at that time, the law would otherwise be used to discriminate against 
blacks.124  In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1,125 decided in 2007, Chief Justice John Roberts invoked 
Justice Harlan’s term to strike down an affirmative action plan 
implemented to boost racial and ethnic diversity in public schools in 
Seattle and St. Louis.126  Justice Harlan, however, had initially used the 
term color-blindness because he could see that external conditions 
which existed at the time, namely widespread racism, would require the 
law, in the face of such racism, to be blind to the color of the disputants 
in order for the law to be applied equally.  Chief Justice Roberts, 
however, used the term in a different sense—to require the law to ignore 
race and ethnicity, even when presented with evidence that one’s color 
still contributes to disadvantage in our society, thus undermining the 
 
 118. WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 55 (noting that judicial blindness and lack of 
care to the particulars of a given case could lead to improper comparisons of “unlike” cases, and also 
arguing against a view of impartiality that encourages such blindness). 
 119. See id. at 55–57.  See also Rebecca K. Lee, Justice for All?, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 217, 
222–23 (2012) (reviewing JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, 
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011)) [hereinafter 
Lee, Justice for All?]. 
 120. See WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 57; Lee, Justice for All?, supra note 119, 
at 218. 
 121. See Pirie, supra note 75, at 549 (sharing that Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. would apply the law 
by using empathy “to see particular and individual persons, not masked,” and not “faceless and 
contextless”).   
 122. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 106, at 91; Lee, Justice for All?, supra note 119, at 223–
28. 
 123. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 124. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 106, at 102. 
 125. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 126. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 106, at 102. 
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core understanding of the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause as an 
anti-subordination provision.127  Being “blind” to race to ensure equal 
treatment for the racially disadvantaged at a time when discrimination 
was overt is clearly unlike blindness to race in trying to ensure equal 
opportunity for the racially disadvantaged when discrimination has 
become covert.  In the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, the “blindness 
of indifference” is not the same thing as the “blindness of impartiality,” 
and the prevailing societal practices must be taken into account in order 
to determine whether blindness furthers the pursuit of justice.128  In fact, 
Supreme Court Justices in case after case have viewed judicial blindness 
as an uninformed and undesirable position from which to understand 
and interpret the law.129  Ultimately, engaging with the particulars of a 
case does not undermine the broad commitment to judicial impartiality 
and fairness but in actuality upholds it.130 
III. CREATING AN EMPATHIC JUDICIARY 
While empathic ability is to some degree an innate trait, it can be 
further developed and learned throughout one’s life with awareness and 
practice.131  Moreover, the capacity to empathize does not differ by 
 
 127. See Hannah L. Weiner, The Subordinated Meaning of “Color-Blind”: How John Marshall 
Harlan’s Words Have Been Erroneously Commandeered, 11 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 45, 46–47 
(2009). 
 128. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 106, at 103. 
 129. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 663 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“Turning a blind eye to the meaning and purpose of Title VII, the majority’s opinion 
perfunctorily rejects a longstanding rule of law . . . .”); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 919 
(1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough . . . courts should refrain from delving into questions 
whether, as a matter of religious doctrine, a particular practice is ‘central’ to the religion . . . I do not 
think this means that the courts must turn a blind eye to the severe impact of a State’s restrictions on the 
adherents of a minority religion”); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 514 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court adopted its modern reading [of the Public Use Clause jurisprudence] blindly, 
with little discussion of the Clause’s history and original meaning. . . . ”); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 
37, 44 (1971) (asserting that the concept of “‘Our Federalism’ . . . does not mean blind deference to 
‘States’ Rights’”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997) (“While overall The Federalist 
reflects a ‘large area of agreement between Hamilton and Madison,’ that is not the case with respect to 
the subject at hand.  To choose Hamilton’s view . . . is to turn a blind eye to the fact that it was 
Madison’s—not Hamilton’s—that prevailed, not only at the Constitutional Convention and in popular 
sentiment, but in the subsequent struggle to fix the meaning of the Constitution by early congressional 
practice.”) (citations omitted); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 121 (1951) (noting that Section 1983 
“has given rise to differences of application” and that “[s]uch differences inhere in the attempt to 
construe the remaining fragments of a comprehensive enactment . . . loosely and blindly drafted in the 
first instance”). 
 130. See Minow, supra note 64, at 92 (stating that “immersion in particulars does not require the 
relinquishment of general commitments” and that “[t]he struggle is not over the validity of principles 
and generalizations—it is over which ones should prevail in a given context”).   
 131. See Decety & Jackson, supra note 27, at 93–94 (noting that “empathy is a motivated process 
that more often than commonly believed is triggered voluntarily” and that “[t]his makes empathy a 
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gender, meaning there is no biological reason that male and female 
judges could not equally employ empathy when deciding cases.132  The 
ability to empathize also can be deepened by reading, and learning from, 
fictional literature.133  This is because the activity of reading novels 
gives one a window into the lives of others, their thoughts and emotions, 
and exercises one’s imagination when one steps outside of one’s own 
experience to view situations from different vantage points.134  The link 
between fiction reading and demonstrations of empathy may be 
additionally explained by the reader’s frequent activity of becoming 
immersed in a narrative and entering the minds of a novel’s 
characters.135  As Justice Stephen Breyer remarked during his Senate 
confirmation proceedings and again in a recent interview, reading 
literature is very helpful in being able to notice and think about the 
different stories of people’s lives.136  It seems to follow that also reading 
 
flexible human capacity”); Rameson et al., supra note 27, at 242 (conducting an empirical study on 
empathy-related neural activity and explaining that the subjects’ variability in trait empathy was not 
necessarily a function of a difference in ability or capacity to empathize, but at the same time that 
empathy appears to be more automatic for individuals high in trait empathy); Henderson, supra note 20, 
at 1583; Jane E. Brody, Empathy’s Natural, but Nurturing It Helps, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/health/16brod.html. 
 132. See Randy Lennon & Nancy Eisenberg, Gender and Age Differences in Empathy and 
Sympathy, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT  195, 195–203 (Nancy Eisenberg & Janet Strayer eds., 
1987); Henderson, supra note 20, at 1582–83. 
 133. See Decety & Jackson, supra note 27, at 84 (“Empathy may be initiated by a variety of 
situations—for instance . . . when one imagines someone else’s behavior, [or] by the reading of a 
narrative in a fiction book . . . in these conditions, empathy requires one to adopt more or less 
consciously the subjective point of view of the other.”); Raymond A. Mar et al., Exploring the Link 
Between Reading Fiction and Empathy: Ruling Out Individual Differences and Examining Outcomes, 
34 COMMUNICATIONS: THE EUR. J. OF COMM., 407 (2009), available at https://docs.google.com/ 
file/d/0B4KSpqWRMt3KZTRjMDA3NjMtOTVhNi00YjI2LWIxMWUtOGZhNjM3ZDYyNzVm/edit?
hl=en_US&pli=1; NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 3–6 (making the case for the relevance of fiction to the 
work of judging); Annie Murphy Paul, Your Brain on Fiction, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/opinion/sunday/the-neuroscience-of-your-brain-on-
fiction.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. 
 134. Paul, supra note 133. 
 135. Mar et al., supra note 133. 
 136. The Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 232 (1994) (testimony of Judge 
Stephen Breyer).  Judge Breyer stated: 
I read something that moved me a lot not very long ago.  I was reading something by Chesterton, 
and he was talking about . . . “Jane Eyre” . . . .  He said if you want to know what that is like, 
you go and you look out at the city, he said—I think he was looking at London—and he said, 
you know, you see all those houses now, even at the end of the 19th century, and they look all as 
if they are the same.  And you think all of those people are out there, going to work, and they are 
all the same.  But, he says, what . . . Bronte tells you is they are not the same.  Each one of those 
persons and each one of those houses and each one of those families is different, and they each 
have a story to tell.  Each of those stories involves something about human passion.  Each of 
those stories involves a man, a woman, children, families, work, lives.  And you get that sense 
out of the book.   
So sometimes, I have found literature very helpful as a way out of the tower. 
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nonfictional works such as memoirs and autobiographies may expand an 
individual’s understanding of others’ lives and perspectives.137  Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor’s memoir, for instance, is an evocative example of a 
book that familiarizes the reader with her particular life circumstances 
and story, and also shows the reader how Sotomayor, while growing up 
and later as a litigator, continually tried to see things as others saw 
them.138  Judges thus could become more adept at empathizing by taking 
steps to expand their knowledge about the human condition, including 
reading more literature. 
Individuals, including judges, concededly may not be able to 
empathize completely with others, because using one’s imagination is 
not the same as actually being in another person’s shoes and living the 
life that person has.  Exercising empathy does not mean perfect 
understanding will be achieved; in fact, attempting to empathize with 
others may lead one to inaccurately or incompletely comprehend 
another’s situation and that person’s needs.139  To lessen this possibility, 
judges can ask questions to improve upon their understanding of a given 
party’s story and perspective.140  Further, empathetic understanding of 
each party must be viewed within the overall context of the dispute from 
the judge’s broader standpoint, because depending on the nature and 
severity of the dispute, the particular individuals involved may have 
difficulty accurately perceiving what happened to them.141  For emotion 
to be useful and trustworthy as a source of information, it should be 
grounded on an accurate picture of the facts and how these facts 
contribute to the litigants’ perceptions of the situation.142  
 
Id. at 232–33.  Kohler, supra note 7 (interview with Justice Stephen Breyer) (“[W]hen you’re a judge 
and you spend your whole day in front of a computer screen, it’s important to be able to imagine what 
other people’s lives might be like, lives that your decisions will affect.  People who are not only different 
from you, but also very different from each other. . . .  [R]eading is a very good thing for a judge to do.  
Reading makes a judge capable of projecting himself into the lives of others, lives that have nothing in 
common with his own, even lives in completely different eras or cultures.”).   
 137. For instance, Kenji Yoshino’s book and part memoir about the phenomenon of covering 
offers a deeply personal look into his life as a gay man, and serves as an example of the type of writing 
that can help others imagine what it may be like to be gay.  See generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: 
THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006). 
138. See SOTOMAYOR, supra note 6.  See also Rebecca K. Lee, Sonia Sotomayor: Role Model of 
Empathy and Purposeful Ambition, 98 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 73 (2013) (reviewing SONIA 
SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD (2013)). 
 139. See Goodman, supra note 50, at 669–70 (quoting Stephanie Wildman, who was trying to find 
a way to help her white students understand what it is like to endure racial harassment: “Racial 
oppression is unique.  Comparing oppressions may lead to a false sense of understanding.”). 
 140. See Henderson, supra note 20, at 1651 (noting that “empathic understanding takes practice 
and work” and that “[p]art of that practice can be accomplished in the form of questioning whether the 
received message is the correct one or asking for clarification”).   
 141. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 73–74. 
 142. See id.  
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Notwithstanding this limitation, however, judges ought to work at 
developing their capacity for empathy as much as possible. 
A. Empathic Ability as a Requirement for Judicial Appointment 
To form an empathic judiciary, empathic ability should be 
unequivocally added to the list of qualifications needed for judicial 
nomination and appointment.143  The issue attracted public attention 
when Barack Obama explained during his 2008 presidential campaign 
that he would select judges who would apply law in real-life situations 
by drawing upon their ability to empathize with different types of 
litigants.144  He introduced this criterion when discussing why as Senator 
he voted against then-Supreme Court nominees John Roberts and 
Samuel Alito: “‘We need somebody who’s got the heart, the empathy, to 
recognize what it’s like to be a young teenage mom, the empathy to 
understand what it’s like to be poor, or African-American, or gay, or 
disabled, or old.’”145   
While preparing to fill a Supreme Court vacancy as President, Obama 
further expressed that he is looking for a candidate “‘who understands 
that justice isn’t about some abstract theory or footnote in a casebook’ 
but that it is also about ‘how our laws affect the daily realities of 
people’s lives.  I view that quality of empathy, of understanding and 
identifying with people’s hopes and struggles as an essential ingredient 
for arriving [at] just decisions and outcomes.’”146  Obama thus seemed 
to be indicating that judges ought to try to understand the range of 
human experiences that would likely be at issue in the cases that come 
before them, particularly involving litigants who are or have been 
disadvantaged in some way.  In selecting a Supreme Court nominee, 
President Obama wanted someone who would use their empathic skills 
to acquire a practical understanding of how society functions and how 
ordinary people live their everyday lives.147  He recognized that empathy 
gives judges the ability to apply the law in a lived sense, fully aware of 
 
 143. See Rameson et al., supra note 27, at 242 (in an empirical study on empathy-related neural 
activity, showing that empathy appears to be a more automatic experience for high-empathy individuals, 
especially when attentional resources are limited, but that normal, healthy individuals without a history 
of major psychiatric illness have a common capacity to empathize when specifically prompted to do so); 
Colby, supra note 8, at 1989–90 (“Since empathy is an essential tool for good judging, and since people 
naturally vary in their empathic abilities, it makes sense that the President should look for judges who 
possess strong empathic skills. . . .  And since empathic abilities seemingly can be honed and improved, 
it makes sense that the President would look for judges who have openly expressed an interest in 
empathy.”).   
 144. Williams, supra note 3.  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. MacGillis, supra note 3.   
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the law’s effect on people in light of their individual situations.   
But the use of empathy has been challenged by politicians who hold a 
narrow view of how judges ought to decide cases and misunderstand 
what is needed for judicial impartiality.  In particular, empathy in 
judging became controversial among Republicans during the Senate 
confirmation process for each of Obama’s two picks for the Supreme 
Court to date, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.148  In response to 
Obama’s comments concerning what he wanted in a Supreme Court 
Justice, Republican legislators challenged the appropriateness of using 
empathy in judicial decisionmaking and commented that the President 
should look for a nominee who would adhere to the “rule of law” and 
not go beyond “interpreting the law.”149  During the Senate confirmation 
hearing of then-Second Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor, several 
Republican senators expressed concern that empathetic judging would 
undermine judicial impartiality because they viewed empathy as giving 
preference to one side, based on the judge’s background, identity 
characteristics, or sympathies.150  They equated empathy with 
 
 148. See generally Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 21; The Nomination of Elena 
Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010).  But see West, The Anti-Empathic Turn, in PASSIONS AND EMOTIONS, 
supra note 1, at 270–74 (arguing that beyond political battles, the anti-empathy turn is part of a larger 
paradigm-shift from traditional to scientific, and from reasoning based on analogy to reasoning based on 
incentive structures).  
 149. See Williams, supra note 3; Kenji Yoshino, On Empathy in Judgment (Measure for 
Measure), 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 683, 683 (2009) [hereinafter Yoshino, On Empathy in Judgment]. 
 150. See generally Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 21.  For instance, Senator Jeff 
Sessions gave the following statement during the hearing: 
I am afraid our system will only be further corrupted, I have to say, as a result of President 
Obama’s views that, in tough cases, the critical ingredient for a judge is the “depth and breadth 
of one’s empathy,” as well as, his word, “their broader vision of what America should be.” 
 . . .  
I want to be clear:  
I will not vote for—and no senator should vote for—an individual nominated by any President 
who is not fully committed to fairness and impartiality toward every person who appears before 
them.   
I will not vote for—and no Senator should vote for—an individual nominated by any President 
who believes it is acceptable for a judge to allow their personal background, gender, prejudices, 
or sympathies to sway their decision in favor of, or against, parties before the court.  In my view, 
such a philosophy is disqualifying. 
Such an approach to judging means that the umpire calling the game is not neutral, but instead 
feels empowered to favor one team over the other. 
Call it empathy, call it prejudice, or call it sympathy, but whatever it is, it is not law.  In truth, it 
is more akin to politics, and politics has no place in the courtroom. 
Id. at 6–7.  In addition, Senator Charles Grassley gave the following statement: 
President Obama said that he would nominate judges based on their ability to empathize in 
general and with certain groups in particular.  This empathy standard is troubling to me.  In fact, 
I am concerned that judging based on empathy is really just legislating from the bench. 
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favoritism—siding with the more sympathetic or more familiar side.151  
Disagreeing with their Republican counterparts, however, Democratic 
Senators expressed support for a broader and balanced view of empathy 
during Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing.152   
 Admittedly, Republican Senators focused on the empathy 
question not only because of Obama’s judicial criteria, but also due 
to remarks Sotomayor made during some of her speeches, the most 
famous of which included her comment that she “‘would hope that a 
wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more 
often than not reach a better conclusion [as a judge].’”153  This 
 
The Constitution requires that judges be free from personal politics, feelings, and preferences.  
President Obama’s empathy standard appears to encourage judges to make use of their personal 
politics, feelings, and preferences.  This is contrary to what most of us understand to be the role 
of the judiciary. 
President Obama clearly believes that you measure up to his empathy standard. That worries me.  
Id. at 17–18. 
 151. See, e.g., Senator Tom Coburn’s statement: 
Senator Obama referred his “empathy standard” when he voted against Chief Justice Roberts.  
He stated, “The tough cases can only be determined on the basis of one’s deepest values, one’s 
core concerns, one’s broader perspective on how the world works, and the depth and breadth of 
one’s empathy.” 
I believe that standard is antithetical to the proper role of a judge.  The American people expect 
their judges to treat all litigants equally, not to favor and not to enter the courtroom already 
prejudiced against one of the parties.  That is why Lady Justice is always depicted blind and why 
Aristotle defined law as “reason free from passion.”  
Do we expect a judge to merely call balls and strikes? Maybe so, maybe not.  But we certainly 
do not expect them to sympathize with one party over the other, and that is where empathy 
comes from. 
Id. at 40. 
 152. See, e.g., Senator Sheldon Whitehouse’s statement: 
I believe that your diverse life experience, your broad professional background, your expertise as 
a judge at each level of the system, will bring you [good] judgment.  As Oliver Wendell Holmes 
famously said, the life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience. 
If your wide experience brings life to a sense of the difficult circumstances faced by the less 
powerful among us: the woman shunted around the bank from voicemail to voicemail as she 
tries to avoid foreclosure for her family; the family struggling to get by in the neighborhood 
where the police only come with raid jackets on; the couple up late at the kitchen table after the 
kids are in bed sweating out how to make ends meet that month; the man who believes a little 
differently, or looks a little different, or thinks things should be different; if you have empathy 
for those people in this job, you are doing nothing wrong. 
Id. at 37.  See also Senator Dianne Feingold’s statement: 
There’s been a lot of talk about this concept of empathy.  In the context of your nomination, a 
judge’s ability to feel empathy does not mean the judge should rule one way or another, as you 
well explained.  But I agree with President Obama that it’s a good thing for our country for 
judges to understand the real-world implications of their decisions and the effects on regular 
Americans, and to seek to understand both sides of an issue. 
Id. at 116. 
 153. As Senator Orrin Hatch stated during Sotomayor’s Senate confirmation hearing: “President 
Obama says that personal empathy is an essential ingredient in judicial decisions.  Today we are urged 
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comment generated many questions during Sotomayor’s 
confirmation hearing, and she explained that the remark was meant to 
be a rhetorical variation of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s statement 
that “a wise old man and a wise old woman” would reach the same 
conclusion when deciding a case—a rhetorical comparison that 
Sotomayor admitted had caused much misunderstanding.154  Another 
Obama nominee for the Supreme Court, then-Solicitor General Elena 
Kagan, was also asked about the President’s empathy standard during 
her Senate confirmation hearing.155  Again, Republican Senators 
viewed empathy as giving preference to one side over another, rather 
than as a capacity to see all sides.156  As a result, Kagan, like 
Sotomayor, disavowed any judicial philosophy involving empathy, at 
least in the political arena of the Senate floor.157 
 The question of empathy or impartiality, however, was not 
raised during the Senate confirmation hearing of then-Third Circuit 
Judge Samuel Alito, who preceded Sotomayor onto the Supreme 
Court bench, despite Alito’s introductory statement discussing his 
father’s immigrant and impoverished background and the influence 
that his parents have had on him.158  In fact, Alito specifically stated 
 
to ignore Judge Sotomayor’s speeches altogether and focus only on her judicial decisions, which are 
extensive.  I do not believe that we should do just that.”  Id. at 12.  Senator Charles Grassley also stated: 
I have reviewed your record and have concerns about your judicial philosophy. For example, in 
one speech you doubted that a judge could ever be truly impartial.  In another speech, you 
argued that it is a disservice both to law and society for judges to disregard personal views 
shaped by one’s “differences as a woman or man of color.” 
In yet another speech, you proclaimed that the court of appeals is where policy is made.  Your 
“wise Latina” comment starkly contradicts a statement by Justice O’Connor that a wise old man 
and a wise old woman would eventually reach the same conclusion in a case. 
These statements go directly to your views of how a judge should use his or her background and 
experience when deciding cases.  Unfortunately, I fear they do not comport with what I and 
many others believe is the proper role of a judge or an appropriate judicial method. 
Id. at 18. 
 154. Id.  
 155. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, supra note 148. 
 156. As Senator Charles E. Grassley stated during the hearing: “In nominating you to be an 
Associate Justice, President Obama clearly believes that you measured up to his judicial empathy 
standard, a judge’s ability, in other words, to empathize with certain groups over others.”  Id. at 15.   
 157. See id. at 18, 103. 
 158. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, to Be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 54–55 
(2006).  Judge Alito’s testimony during his Senate confirmation hearing included the following remarks: 
I am who I am in the first place because of my parents and because of the things that they taught 
me, and I know from my own experience as a parent that parents probably teach most 
powerfully not through their words but through their deeds.  And my parents taught me through 
the stories of their lives, and I don’t take any credit for the things that they did or the things that 
they experienced.  But they made a great impression on me. 
My father was brought to this country as an infant.  He lost his mother as a teenager.  He grew 
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during his hearing that he thinks about his Italian ancestors when 
presiding over cases involving an immigrant, or more specifically 
about family members or friends and acquaintances when relevant to 
thinking through issues in a case.159  But Alito, who was nominated 
by President George W. Bush, was not subject to the same degree of 
questioning by the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding his ability 
or commitment to judge objectively in light of his comments.160 
Despite the charges of some legislators, it is apparent that judges of 
every ideological stripe use empathy when siding with one party rather 
than another, including so-called rule-bound judges who, despite being 
characterized as ruling objectively and rationally, in actuality tend to 
favor the views of those who share their backgrounds or leanings.161  It 
 
up in poverty. . . . 
My mother is a first-generation American.  Her father worked in the Roebling Steel Mill in 
Trenton, New Jersey.  Her mother came from a culture in which women generally did not even 
leave the house alone, and yet my mother became the first person in her family to get a college 
degree. . . . 
I got here in part because of the community in which I grew up.  It was a warm but definitely an 
unpretentious, down-to-earth community.  Most of the adults in the neighborhood were not 
college graduates.  I attended the public schools. 
Id. 
 159. Id.  As Alito testified: 
[I]n my opening statement, I tried to provide a little picture of who I am as a human being and 
how my background and my experiences have shaped me and brought me to this point.  I don’t 
come from an affluent background or a privileged background.  My parents were both quite poor 
when they were growing up. . . .  I think that children learn a lot from their parents and they 
learn from what the parents say, but I think they learn a lot more from what the parents do and 
from what they take from the stories of their parents’ lives. 
And that’s why I went into that in my opening statement, because when a case comes before me 
involving, let’s say, someone who is an immigrant, and we get an awful lot of immigration cases 
and naturalization cases, I can’t help but think of my [Italian] ancestors because it wasn’t that 
long ago when they were in that position.  And so it’s my job to apply the law.  It’s not my job to 
change the law or to bend the law to achieve any results, but I have to, when I look at those 
cases, I have to say to myself, and I do say to myself, this could be your grandfather.  This could 
be your grandmother.  They were not citizens at one time and they were people who came to this 
country. 
When I have cases involving children, I can’t help but think of my own children and think about 
my children being treated in the way the children may be treated in the case that’s before me.  
And that goes down the line.  When I get a case about discrimination, I have to think about 
people in my own family who suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background or 
because of religion or because of gender, and I do take that into account.  When I have a case 
involving someone who’s been subjected to discrimination because of disability, I have to think 
of people who I’ve known and admired very greatly who had disabilities and I’ve watched them 
struggle to overcome the barriers that society puts up, often just because it doesn’t think of what 
it’s doing, the barriers that it puts up to them. 
Id. at 475. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Susan Bandes, Why is Empathy Controversial? Or Liberal?, BALKINIZATION BLOG, 
May 25, 2009, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/05/why-is-empathy-controversial-or-liberal.html 
[hereinafter Bandes, Why is Empathy Controversial?]. 
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appears the use of judicial empathy is seen as “activist” when it favors 
the disadvantaged, and invisible when it favors the elite.162  Judges may 
claim, and have claimed, that they do not follow a particular judicial 
philosophy when deciding cases, but, in believing this, they fail to see 
when they gravitate toward the more familiar litigant’s account, without 
testing their assumptions against other views.163  Because judges will 
likely view the facts from some standpoint—that is, they will have some 
empathy for one party, whether they try to or not—judges will be acting 
partially unless they actively think about what it is like to stand in the 
place of the party more differently situated from them.164  Further, it is 
hardly the case that laws can be applied in a vacuum, without facts to 
give real-life meaning and context for legal interpretation, especially 
where one’s view of the facts can make the difference in outcome.165   
It makes sense that a judge’s approach to adjudication matters in the 
truly difficult cases, where different minds can disagree depending on 
how they perceive the entire context of the dispute and the perspectives 
of the litigants.  As then-Senator Obama explained when opposing John 
Roberts’ confirmation as Chief Justice: 
[W]hile adherence to legal precedent and rules of statutory or 
constitutional construction will dispose of 95 percent of the cases that 
come before a court, so that both a Scalia and a Ginsburg will arrive at 
the same place most of the time on those 95 percent of the cases—what 
matters on the Supreme Court is those 5 percent of cases that are truly 
difficult.  In those cases, adherence to precedent and rules of construction 
and interpretation will only get you through the 25th mile of the 
marathon.  The last mile can only be determined on the basis of one’s 
deepest values, one’s core concerns, one’s broader perspectives on how 
the world works, and the depth and breadth of one’s empathy.166 
Expressing a similar sentiment, at least one federal appellate judge has 
observed that judges reach the same outcome in 96 percent of cases, 
regardless of who the judge is, but that for the remainder of the cases, 
the individual makeup of the panel will determine the outcome.167  The 
 
 162. Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 57, at 141.  See Confirmation Hearing on the 
Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, supra note 21, at 6 (statement of Senator Jeff Sessions) (“I fear that [President Obama’s] 
‘empathy standard’ is another step down the road to a liberal activist, results-oriented, and relativistic 
world where laws lose their fixed meaning, unelected judges set policy . . . .”).   
 163. See Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 57, at 140–41 (discussing Supreme Court Chief 
Justice John Robert’s denial of having any legal philosophy).   
 164. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 165. See discussion supra Parts II.B and II.C. 
 166. 151 CONG. REC. S10366 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Sen. Barack Obama). 
 167. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW, xiii (2002 ed.) (basing his 
observation on having ruled on over 3,000 federal appellate cases as a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals and his own dissent rate of about 3.4 percent). 
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panel makeup, along with whether there is a strong dissent, also will 
largely determine whether the panel opinion will be reversed by an en 
banc court or be further considered by the Supreme Court.168 
Obama’s picture of the empathic judge concerned his critics, who 
feared that a judge acting on empathy would ignore legal rules in order 
to favor the side with whom she or he could better relate.169  To the 
contrary, an empathic judge would seek to understand those who are less 
familiar to him, those for whom he must make extra effort to identify 
with.  This is needed to counterbalance the unspoken empathy the judge 
will be inclined to have toward those he does easily identify with.  In 
this respect, judicial empathy is indeed needed to achieve an impartial 
view of a given case, and to maintain the rule of law itself. 
B. Diversifying the Bench for a More Empathic Judiciary 
Having judges who themselves have a diverse set of experiences and 
backgrounds would facilitate an empathic approach in the juridical role, 
as would having judges in general who would be more mindful to 
employ empathy to imagine the positions of others.170  This is not to say 
that diverse judges are necessarily more empathic, but rather that a 
bench consisting of judges with diverse characteristics and from diverse 
life paths will better relate to a wider range of litigants.  The identity of 
the jurist, it turns out, can and does matter in how she decides certain 
cases.171  Cases that are close or difficult, or that lack clear or consistent 
case law on the issue, are the ones that will be decided differently 
depending on the adjudicator.172  As Senior Ninth Circuit Judge John T. 
Noonan, Jr. has commented:   
Any experienced judge on our court can predict what the result will be in 
such a case by knowing the names of the three members of the panel; so 
can any watcher of the court.  The prediction will not have 100 percent 
accuracy but accuracy enough to demonstrate that the person of the judge 
has affected the selection of the rule.173   
The identity of the judge matters because the judge’s background and 
 
 168. Wald, supra note 63, at 894. 
 169. Yoshino, On Empathy in Judgment, supra note 149, at 698–99. 
 170. Franks, supra note 2, at 72 (“What minority judges, as well as non-minority judges with 
strong capacities for empathy, may be able to do is to contribute other interests and views to the 
judiciary’s collective moral imagination.  None of these interests, of course, should by themselves 
determine the outcome of any case, but they may provide for a fuller deliberative experience.”). 
 171. NOONAN, supra note 167. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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lived experience contribute to the decisions they make.174  In this 
respect, a diverse judiciary would better ensure that those who hear and 
decide claims will possess a range of experiences that will inform their 
decisionmaking.175  Increasing diversity on the federal and state benches 
also would strengthen the public’s faith in the fairness of the judiciary, 
and may further encourage litigants to more comfortably and fully share 
their stories so that they may be better heard.176  “The life of the 
law . . . has been experience,” as former Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
put it,177 and we might add that to continue breathing life into the law, 
such experience must be broad and varied. 
Yet the judiciary still largely lacks this breadth of experience and 
background.  With regard to race and ethnicity, on the federal bench 
only 18.7% of all currently sitting federal judges are nonwhite, 
comprised of the following racial and ethnic groups: 9.9% are African 
American, 1.8% are Asian American, 6.9% are Hispanic, and 0.1% are 
either American Indian or Pacific Islander.178  Of all the sitting chief 
judges on the federal courts, 13.2% are people of color: 9.3% are 
 
 174. See id. Judge Patricia Wald, who served as a federal appellate judge on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, has explained that a judge’s background and experiences can and do 
influence her decisionmaking and decisions.  As she recounts: 
The maxim that a wise man and a wise woman come to the same conclusions is endlessly 
repeated, but I think it somewhat simplistic.  And certainly different wise women will come to 
different conclusions.  Nearer the truth, I think, is that being a woman and being treated by 
society as a woman can be a vital element of a judge’s experience.  That experience in turn can 
subtly affect the lens through which she views issues and solutions.  I can think of a few cases 
where being a woman entered into my conscience, but I can think of just as many where having 
worked in a factory, having been a Legal Services lawyer and having been a government official 
who dealt with Congress affected my perspective just as much.  A judge is the sum of her 
experiences and if she has suffered disadvantages or discrimination as a woman, she is apt to be 
sensitive to its subtle expressions or to paternalism.   
Patricia M. Wald, Six Not-So-Easy Pieces: One Woman Judge’s Journey to the Bench and Beyond, 36 
U. TOL. L. REV. 979, 989 (2005) [hereinafter Wald, One Woman Judge’s Journey to the Bench]. 
 175. See NOONAN, supra note 167 (stating that “[m]y sense of the critical effect of the judge’s 
own background, experience, and personality upon the judge’s work has led me to appreciate the 
desirability of diversity in judicial appointments”). 
 176. See Wald, One Woman Judge’s Journey to the Bench, supra note 174, at 989 (stating the 
importance of the public’s perception of the courts and that litigants and the larger public would have 
less confidence in a male-dominated or homogeneous bench). 
 177. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881), reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM 9 (William W. Fisher III et al., eds. 1993). 
 178. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited 
December 2, 2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting 
judges) (indicating that there are 1,334 sitting judges at the federal level); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited December 2, 2013) (click on “Select 
research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting judges by race or ethnicity) (indicating that 
of all sitting judges at the federal level, 132 are African American, 1 is American Indian, 24 are Asian 
American, 92 are Hispanic, and 1 is Pacific Islander). 
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African American, 0.2% is American Indian, 0.7% are Asian American, 
and 2.9% are Hispanic.179  On the federal appellate bench, minorities 
make up 17.5% of all sitting judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals: 9.5% 
are African American, 1.8% are Asian American, and 6.2% are 
Hispanic.180   
This racial and ethnic homogeneity may mean that white litigants 
who come before mostly white judges will receive a favorable outcome 
more often than minority litigants.181  For instance, in cases where 
employment discrimination is alleged, research shows that white judges 
find in favor of the employer defendant on summary judgment much 
more often (more than half of the time) than minority judges do.182  Yet 
white judges are more likely to deny the employer’s motion for 
summary judgment and rule in favor of the plaintiff when the plaintiff is 
white and less likely to do so when the plaintiff is not white.183  Minority 
 
 179. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES,  http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited 
December 2, 2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting judges 
and chief judges) (indicating a total of 409 Chief Judges currently sitting on the federal bench); 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES,  http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited December 2, 
2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting judges and chief 
judges by race and ethnicity) (indicating that of all sitting Chief Judges at the federal level, 38 are 
African American, 1 is American Indian, 3 are Asian American, 12 are Hispanic, and 0 are Pacific 
Islander). 
 180. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited 
December 2, 2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting judges 
and court type U.S. Court of Appeals) (indicating that there are 274 sitting judges on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited 
December 2, 2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting judges 
and court type U.S. Court of Appeals by race or ethnicity)  (indicating that on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 
26 sitting judges are African American, 0 sitting judges are American Indian, 5 sitting judges are Asian 
American, 17 sitting judges are Hispanic, and 0 are Pacific Islander). 
 181. See Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 14, at 350 (pointing to research finding that individuals 
show more empathy toward those who are more similar to themselves).   
 182. Id. at 338–39 (reporting the results of an empirical study using data from a large random 
sample of federal district court filings of employment civil rights cases between 1988–2003 in 7 cities: 
Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, New Orleans, New York City, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, and finding 
that white judges ruled for the defendant employer on a motion for summary judgment in 61% of cases 
while minority judges did the same in only 38% of cases, and that this difference is statistically 
significant). 
 183. Id. at 343.  Specifically, the authors report the following findings from their study: 
[W]hen a white judge decides a case involving a white plaintiff, the plaintiff’s case (or some 
portion of it) has a 40 percent predicted probability of surviving a motion for summary 
judgment.  When a white judge adjudicates a case involving a minority plaintiff, however, the 
predicted probability of the plaintiff’s case surviving summary judgment drops to roughly 34.43 
percent.   
Minority judges are more likely to allow employment civil rights cases to continue past motions 
for summary judgment regardless of the race of the plaintiff.  When a minority judge presides 
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judges, however, do not rule differently depending on the plaintiff’s 
race.184   
Given that federal judges in the U.S. are presidentially nominated, the 
chief executive mainly determines the presence or absence of 
heterogeneity in new federal judgeships as judicial openings arise.  
President Obama has already made his mark with his choice of Supreme 
Court nominees, having appointed two female Justices in a row, one of 
whom is a Latina.  Additionally, at the federal appellate level, 
approximately 50% of Obama’s nominees during his initial term as 
President were minorities and 40% were women—the most diverse 
group in the nation’s history.185  For example, half of the Asian 
American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) judges at the federal level—out 
of a total of 16—were nominated and confirmed during Obama’s first 
term.186  
With respect to gender, however, men continue to greatly outnumber 
women in the judiciary, and minority women are even less represented.  
At the federal level, only 23.5% of all currently sitting federal judges are 
women,187 and only 6.1% are women of color.188  Of all chief judges on 
 
over a case involving a minority plaintiff, the plaintiff’s case (or some portion of it), has an 
84.48 percent predicted probability of surviving summary judgment.  And, consistent with prior 
research, our data demonstrates that a minority judge is likely to allow some portion of a white 
plaintiff’s case to continue at nearly the same predicted probability (87.42 percent). 
Id. 343–44. 
 184. Id. 
 185. ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, REPORTS ON THE JUDICIARY: THE CHANGING FACE OF THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS, http://www.afj.org/judicial-selection/judicial-selection-reports.html and 
http://www.afj.org/judicial-selection/the-changing-face-of-the-federal-circuit-courts.pdf (last visited 
July 29, 2012).  See also Alliance for Justice Data Highlights Effects on Gender, Racial, Professional, 
and Party Diversity of President Obama’s Circuit Court Nominees, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, 
http://www.afj.org/press/09082011.html (noting that “90 percent of the [federal circuit] judges the 
Obama nominees are replacing are white and 80 percent are male—a harbinger of significant changes 
coming to the federal judiciary”). 
 186. Christopher Kang, Federal Judges That Resemble the Nation They Serve, THE WHITE HOUSE 
BLOG (March 29, 2012, 1:33 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/03/29/federal-judges-
resemble-nation-they-serve.  The White House Blog also provides the following information about 
Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) federal judges: 
When . . . President [Obama] took office, there were only eight AAPI Article III federal judges 
out of 874, and there hadn’t been an AAPI judge on a U.S. Court of Appeals since 2004.  Now, 
there are 16 AAPI judges on the federal bench and, in 2010, Judge Denny Chin was 
unanimously confirmed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  In all, almost six percent of 
President Obama’s confirmed judges have been AAPI, compared to just one percent for 
Presidents Bush and Clinton.   
Id.  These include the first female judges of Chinese, Korean, South Asian, and Vietnamese descent, 
which increased the number of AAPI women judges in U.S. history by fourfold. Id.  Of these new 
judges, Judge Jacqueline Nguyen is the first AAPI woman to ever serve on a federal appellate court.  Id.  
See also Lisa Mascaro, Jacqueline H. Nguyen of LA confirmed to U.S. 9th Circuit Court, L.A. TIMES, 
May 7, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/07/nation/la-na-nguyen-20120508. 
 187. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited 
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the federal courts, 19.5% are female and 3.2% are females of color.189  
At the federal appellate level, women make up 22.6% and minority 
women make up 4.4% of all sitting judges on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals.190  Women fare slightly better at the state judicial level, with 
women recently accounting for 27.1% of all state judges.191   
This gender disparity should not be ignored because whether a case is 
heard by a female or male judge can make a difference to the outcome.  
Studies have shown that in cases involving sex discrimination, the 
 
December 2, 2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting 
judges) (indicating that there are 1,334 sitting judges at the federal level); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited December 2, 2013) (click on “Select 
research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting judges by gender) (indicating that there are 
313 female sitting judges at the federal level). 
 188. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited 
December 2, 2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting judges 
by gender and race or ethnicity) (indicating that out of a total of 1,334 judges who currently sit on the 
federal bench, 44 are African American women, 0 are American Indian women, 10 are Asian American 
women, and 27 are Hispanic women). 
 189. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES,  http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited 
December 2, 2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting judges 
and chief judges) (indicating a total of 405 Chief Judges currently sitting on the federal bench); 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited December 2, 
2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting judges and chief 
judges by gender) (indicating a total of 79 female Chief Judges currently sitting on the federal bench); 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited December 2, 
2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting judges and chief 
judges by gender and race or ethnicity) (indicating that of all sitting Chief Judges at the federal level, 8 
are African American women, 0 are American Indian women, 1 is an Asian American woman, 4 are 
Hispanic women, and 0 are Pacific Islander women). 
 190. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited 
December 2, 2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting judges 
and court type U.S. Court of Appeals) (indicating that there are 274 sitting judges on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited 
December 2, 2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all sitting judges 
and court type U.S. Court of Appeals by gender) (indicating that there are 62 female sitting judges on 
the U.S. Court of Appeals); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html 
(last visited December 2, 2013) (click on “Select research categories” hyperlink; then limit query to all 
sitting judges and court type U.S. Court of Appeals by gender and race or ethnicity) (indicating that on 
the U.S. Court of Appeals, 8 sitting judges are African American women, 0 sitting judges are American 
Indian women, 1 sitting judge is an Asian American woman, 3 sitting judges are Hispanic women, and 0 
are Pacific Islander women). 
 191. Forster-Long’s Gender Diversity Survey 2012 vs. 2011: By State, in THE AMERICAN BENCH: 
JUDGES OF THE NATION (2012) (showing that in 2012, 5,349 state judges are female, out of a total of 
19,763 state judges). 
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presence of one female judge on an appellate panel makes it more likely 
that the plaintiff will prevail, and the presence of two female judges on 
the panel increases the plaintiff’s chances even further.192  Moreover, 
having female judges on the panel also may have an effect on the way 
their male colleagues on the panel decide cases, and in fact male judges 
are more likely to vote in favor of plaintiffs in sex discrimination suits 
when a female judge is also part of the panel than when the panel is all 
men.193  It appears that male judges are likely to acknowledge the 
different life experiences of female judges and thus may give greater 
weight to female jurists’ understanding of a case when it involves 
gender discrimination.194   
A diverse range of judges will better notice the various complexities 
and subtleties present in difficult cases, particularly those involving 
charges of inequity and exclusion.  For judges to better understand 
litigants’ experiences, it helps if judges have relevant experiences of 
their own.  All judges, however, will preside over cases involving 
parties who are different from them in some way, making it important 
for each and every judge to use empathy in resolving disputes.  No judge 
will have experienced firsthand every type of concern that will be 
decided by them, and thus judicial empathy and openness to the less 
familiar side remain essential in order for judging and judicial outcomes 
to be impartially informed.   
IV. EMPATHY’S ROLE IN JUDGING: CASE EXAMPLES IN THE EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION CONTEXT 
To illustrate the argument that judicial impartiality requires judicial 
empathy, the following case examples in the employment discrimination 
context serve as good vehicles through which to examine empathy’s role 
in judging.  The use of empathy is particularly important in cases 
involving some form of discrimination because the perspective the judge 
takes in weighing the facts and exploring the litigants’ stories often is 
central to how the case is decided, and whether it proceeds to trial.  This 
 
 192. See Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking 
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1767–68 (2005) (looking at 556 federal appellate 
decisions involving sex discrimination and harassment from 1999–2001 and finding that when a female 
judge was part of the appellate panel, plaintiffs won 34% of the time compared to 17% in front of an all-
male panel, and plaintiffs won 43% of the time when two female judges were part of the panel); 
Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effect of Sex on Judging, 54 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 389, 
399–406 (examining various claims decided from 1995–2002 and finding that for sex discrimination 
claims, male judges on an all-male panel were 10% more likely to rule against plaintiffs, but when a 
female judge was part of the panel, the male judges were 15% more likely to rule for plaintiffs). 
 193. Peresie, supra note 192; Boyd et al., supra note 192. 
 194. Peresie, supra note 192; Boyd et al., supra note 192. 
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viewpoint, in turn, tends to be informed by the adjudicator’s own 
characteristics and experiences, which further influences with which 
litigant the judge most identifies.  But to engage in objective 
deliberation, judges must make genuine effort to see the perspective of 
the lesser-known side.  With this goal in mind, the cases below 
demonstrate empathetic decisionmaking on a spectrum, the first 
presenting a more straightforward scenario and the second presenting a 
harder case.  
A. McGinest v. GTE Service Corporation (9th Cir. 2002)195 
McGinest provides contrasting examples of the use of judicial 
empathy at the trial and appellate levels.  This case involves George 
McGinest, an African-American male plaintiff who brought claims 
against his employer, GTE Service Corporation (GTE),196 under Title 
VII for racial hostile work environment, race discrimination in failure to 
promote, and retaliation due to race.197  At the time he filed this lawsuit, 
McGinest had worked at the telecommunications company for more 
than twenty years, having been first hired as a lineman and then working 
as a plant construction worker and relief supervisor.198  He continued to 
work at GTE during this litigation.199   
To support his hostile work environment claim based on race, he 
described a number of incidents that took place over a period of fifteen 
years.  The factual details can be found in the appellate court’s decision, 
which carefully reviews all of the facts and organizes them by incident 
type.200  The first set of discriminatory events is categorized as “concrete 
actions.”201  Many of these actions were committed by Jim Noson, 
McGinest’s supervisor for a period of five to six years at a GTE 
worksite in Long Beach.202  McGinest testified that Noson’s harassing 
actions and comments toward him were all due to his race, although 
Noson did not necessarily make explicitly racial statements while 
engaging in this behavior.203  As McGinest recounted, Noson required 
him to perform his work under hazardous circumstances, such as 
working without access to adequate equipment and without enough crew 
 
 195. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 196. The Court notes that GTE is now owned by Verizon.  Id. at 1107 n.1. 
 197. Id. at 1106. 
 198. Id. at 1107. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. at 1107–12. 
 201. Id. at 1107–09. 
 202. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1107–08. 
 203. Id. at 1107. 
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members to work safely.204  Noson also used offensive and belittling 
language toward McGinest, and once remarked, upon seeing McGinest 
wearing a gold chain, that “only drug dealers can afford nice gold 
chains.”205  Noson further said he wished he had the power to terminate 
McGinest.206  McGinest noted that Noson had also acted disparagingly 
toward a white coworker who was a friend of McGinest’s, and that the 
coworker was targeted for abusive treatment typically when he was with 
McGinest.207  McGinest first complained about Noson to Noson’s 
supervisor, Hank Bisnar, but after the situation failed to improve, 
McGinest made an internal complaint listing twelve discriminatory 
incidents involving Noson.208  GTE responded by conducting an internal 
investigation and found that Noson had simply engaged in 
“‘shoptalk.’”209  Noson, however, was directed to make an apology to 
McGinest, which according to McGinest was never done.210   
McGinest complained of other incidents as well.  He alleged that for a 
period of two years, he was not permitted to collect overtime pay for 
overtime work as a relief supervisor, although non-black relief 
supervisors routinely received overtime compensation.211  McGinest 
also experienced a serious problem with the upkeep of his company 
vehicle.212  Noticing that one of the tires was worn out and needed to be 
replaced, he requested a new tire but this request was denied.213  Soon 
thereafter, he suffered a major accident when the tire blew out while he 
was driving for work, causing him to crash into a wall and suffer injuries 
requiring a hospital visit.214  McGinest testified that white employees did 
not face any problems in having their repair requests approved and 
pointed out that a white employee who had also asked for new tires at 
around the same time was able to obtain them.215  A white coworker 
additionally testified that the garage mechanic and the foreman, who had 
received McGinest’s request for a new tire, treated McGinest and two 
other black employees worse than the white employees.216 
The appellate court also discussed the use of racial insults by 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 1108. 
 208. Id. 
 209. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1108. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1108–09. 
 216. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1109. 
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supervisors and coworkers directed at McGinest, including an incident 
in which a coworker, Tom Hughes, called McGinest a “‘stupid 
n[*****]’ to his face” and within earshot of another coworker.217  Very 
upset, McGinest left the building after this episode and the following 
day told his immediate supervisor about the name-calling.218  McGinest 
then filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), prompting the company’s human resources 
manager, Jeff Nakamura, to commence an investigation.219  But the 
investigation was dropped after Hughes denied making the racial 
comment and the EEOC refused to reveal the name of the coworker who 
had overheard the remark, leading to a wait of two years for Nakamura 
to re-open the investigation.220  Once Nakamura confirmed that Hughes 
had used the racial slur, Hughes was “counseled against using such 
words, shown a video on sexual harassment, and received a disciplinary 
memo.”221 
Other coworkers also made racially derogatory comments about 
McGinest, including statements such as “‘I’ll retire before I work for a 
Black man,’” and “‘I refuse to work for that dumb son of a bitch,’” all of 
which McGinest reported to his supervisor and manager.222  Another 
coworker, Daniel DeLeon, gave Matt Ketchum, a white coworker who 
was friendly with McGinest, the nickname “Aunt Jemima,” and said 
McGinest was Ketchum’s “‘mammy.’”223  McGinest told DeLeon that 
he found the “Aunt Jemima” comment racially offensive and asked him 
not to use it, but DeLeon replied with “‘f[***] you.’”224  Although 
McGinest brought the incident to the attention of his manager and 
supervisor, the human resources manager only investigated this incident 
after receiving a call from the EEOC.225  Nakamura then questioned 
DeLeon and told him to no longer use that term.226   
In laying out the facts, the appellate court also referred to the racist 
graffiti that could be found in the men’s bathroom at work and on work 
equipment on a regular basis, and which “included the word ‘n[*****],’ 
sometimes altered to ‘digger,’ and the phrase ‘white is right.’”227  This 
graffiti remained fully visible for weeks at a time, in view of managers 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1110. 
 223. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1110. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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who also used these restrooms, with no censure made by the 
company.228  McGinest (and a coworker) complained to management 
once about the graffiti, and McGinest also avoided using the bathroom 
so that he would not have to see the racist language.229   
Although GTE had a written antidiscrimination policy, it did not 
include any consequences for violations of the policy.230  Moreover, the 
policy briefly stated that an employee should talk to a supervisor or 
human resources representative if the employee had questions about 
equal employment opportunity, discrimination, or affirmative action, but 
failed to explain the steps an employee should take in response to any 
discriminatory treatment.231   
The appellate court next explored the facts regarding McGinest’s 
failure to promote claim.  GTE had an opening for the position of 
Outside Plant Construction Installer Supervisor in September 1998, and 
McGinest sought a promotion by applying for the position.232  Although 
he was chosen for this job after passing the required test and completing 
an interview conducted by supervisor Mike Begg, he was unable to 
move into the position due to a company-wide salary and hiring freeze, 
despite the fact that there was little evidence of a salary freeze during 
this time.233  A different employee then filled the position laterally.234  
McGinest had filed his earlier EEOC complaint a year and a half before 
the company decided not to move him into the Installer Supervisor 
position.235  McGinest argued that GTE had few African-Americans in 
its workforce and that they faced obstacles in moving up the company 
rungs.236  At McGinest’s facility in Huntington Beach, there were only 
five or six African-American employees out of a total of seventy, and 
there were no African-American supervisors.237   
McGinest first filed a hostile work environment claim based on race 
with the EEOC, and then filed a second complaint for failure to promote 
based on race.238  After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, 
McGinest brought suit against GTE and supervisor Begg.239  The federal 
district court granted GTE’s and Begg’s motions for summary judgment 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1111. 
 230. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1111. 
 231. Id.   
 232. Id. 
 233. Id.   
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1111. 
 238. Id. at 1111–12. 
 239. Id. at 1112. 
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on all claims, dismissing the hostile work environment claim based on 
race because the court found that the incidents were infrequent and 
mostly adequately remedied.240  District Judge Christina Snyder 
believed GTE’s view of the facts and concluded that there was little 
evidentiary support for the racial hostility alleged by McGinest.241  In 
this regard, the district court judge demonstrated a surprising lack of 
empathy in trying to understand and see the various incidents from 
McGinest’s standpoint as a black man, and without the benefit of a trial 
to better determine the facts, thereby failing to demonstrate objectivity 
in judging. 
McGinest appealed the portion of the district court’s judgment 
pertaining to GTE, asserting three claims under Title VII for hostile 
work environment race harassment, failure to promote due to race, and 
failure to promote due to retaliation.242  The Ninth Circuit appellate 
panel assigned to the case consisted of Circuit Judges Stephen 
Reinhardt, Diarmuid O’Scannlain, and Richard Paez, and the majority 
opinion was written by Judge Paez, joined by Judge Reinhardt.243  The 
appellate court conducted a de novo review of the summary judgment 
decision below, and began its review by highlighting the need to protect 
an employee’s right to a trial in cases involving discrimination, 
explaining that such claims are typically hard to prove unless the 
opportunity is given to present and assess all of the evidence, including 
the credibility of witnesses.244  The court thus expressed caution about 
deciding employment discrimination cases on summary judgment, 
recognizing the importance of understanding the full facts that make up 
discrimination claims before a ruling can be made.245   
To prevail on his hostile work environment claim, McGinest had to 
show that the workplace involved racial harassment that was both 
objectively and subjectively hostile so as to alter the conditions of 
employment and thereby create an abusive work environment.246  He 
had to further show that GTE neglected to take sufficient corrective or 
disciplinary measures.247  The evidence easily established that the 
working environment was subjectively hostile to McGinest, as 
demonstrated by his unchallenged testimony and the numerous 
 
 240. Id. at 1107–08, 1115 n.5. 
 241. Id. at 1115 n.5, 1116. 
 242. Id. at 1112. 
 243. Id. at 1106. 
 244. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1112. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id.  As the Court points out, the harassment also must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
alter the conditions of employment for the plaintiff and create an abusive work environment.  Id. at 
1112–13. 
 247. Id. at 1112.  
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complaints made to supervisors at GTE and to the EEOC.248  Judge Paez 
explained that whether the workplace is objectively hostile must be 
considered from the reasonable perspective of the target of the 
harassment—the plaintiff—and when evaluating a racially hostile 
workplace, “from the perspective of a reasonable person belonging to 
the racial or ethnic group of the plaintiff.”249  Thus, in McGinest’s case, 
the perspective of a reasonable African-American man must be used to 
determine whether the work environment was hostile in an objective 
sense.250  In articulating this standard, the Ninth Circuit referred to its 
decision in Ellison v. Brady,251 a hostile work environment sex 
harassment case in which the court assessed objective hostility from the 
perspective of a reasonable woman.252  Because the Supreme Court has 
stated that “[h]ostile work environment claims based on racial 
harassment are reviewed under the same standard as those based on 
sexual harassment,”253 the McGinest Court used the Ellison standard, 
adapting it for the racial harassment claims at issue.254 
In McGinest, the Ninth Circuit perceived the need for judges to 
consider the plaintiff’s story from the reasonable perspective of 
someone who shares the plaintiff’s race or ethnicity to objectively 
determine whether the harassment was hostile.  As the Court explained:  
Racially motivated comments or actions may appear innocent or only 
mildly offensive to one who is not a member of the targeted group, but in 
reality be intolerably abusive or threatening when understood from the 
perspective of a plaintiff who is a member of the targeted group . . . .  By 
considering both the existence and the severity of discrimination from the 
perspective of a reasonable person of the plaintiff’s race, we recognize 
forms of discrimination that are real and hurtful, and yet may be 
overlooked if considered solely from the perspective of an adjudicator 
belonging to a different group than the plaintiff.255 
 
 248. Id. at 1113–14. 
 249. Id. at 1115.   
 250. Id. at 1112. 
 251. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 252. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 253. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 n.10 (2002). 
 254. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1115.  In McGinest, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Ellison standard for 
race harassment cases, even though it had earlier revised the Ellison standard as applied in the sex 
harassment context in Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995).  In Fuller, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that “[w]hether the workplace is objectively hostile must be determined from the 
perspective of a reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics.”  Id. at 1527. 
 255. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1116.  According to the appellate court, the facts, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to McGinest as the nonmoving party, were adequate to survive a summary 
judgment motion.  Id. at 1113–14.  Given that GTE challenged McGinest’s view of the facts, such 
differences about material facts along with credibility questions required a resolution at trial.  Id. at 1115 
n.5.  
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In assessing plaintiff McGinest’s hostile work environment claim, the 
Court noted that “‘[t]he omnipresence of race-based attitudes and 
experiences in the lives of black Americans [may cause] even 
nonviolent events to be interpreted as degrading, threatening, and 
offensive,’”256 and quoted several other cases to explain how African-
Americans, as opposed to white observers, may view certain incidents 
and remarks.257  Further explaining the effect of the word “n[*****]” 
and the racial violence it brings to mind, the Court stated that the “direct 
verbal attack on McGinest and the prevalence of graffiti containing a 
racial slur evocative of lynchings and racial hierarchy are significant 
exacerbating factors in evaluating the severity of the racial hostility.”258   
The Court in its majority decision thus found that McGinest 
compellingly showed the existence of a racially hostile workplace, 
enough to survive the employer’s motion for summary judgment.259  As 
for whether GTE took appropriate remedial and corrective action in 
response, the Court found that GTE was vicariously liable for the 
actions of McGinest’s supervisors, as well as liable for the actions of 
McGinest’s coworkers.260  Regarding McGinest’s failure to promote 
claim due to race discrimination, the Court again found that McGinest 
raised a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary judgment, but 
found the evidence insufficient to support his retaliation claim because 
his promotion denial came a year and a half after he had filed his initial 
EEOC complaint.261   
The appellate court in its majority decision sought to better maintain 
judicial objectivity by trying to understand whether McGinest’s 
 
 256. Id. at 1116 (quoting Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F.Supp. 1509, 1516 (D. Me. 1991)).  
 257. Id.   
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 1118. 
 260. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1118–21.  Although an employer may assert an affirmative defense to 
avoid vicarious liability for a supervisor’s conduct in creating a hostile work environment, GTE, while 
mentioning the affirmative defense in its summary judgment motion, did not raise the defense before the 
appellate court.  Id. at 1119.  Thus, the court assumed that GTE was liable for the supervisors’ actions, 
but acknowledged that GTE could assert the defense on remand for the district court to assess.  Id.  
 261. Id. at 1121–25.  Judge O’Scannlain wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.  He believed that McGinest’s allegations regarding supervisor Noson were time barred, and that the 
evidence failed to support McGinest’s allegations that the tire incident and claim of different bonus 
overtime pay were due to his race.  Id. at 1125–32 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  Judge O’Scannlain thus declined to consider these allegations as part of McGinest’s overall 
hostile work environment claim.  Id.  Conducting a separate analysis reviewing the remaining set of 
facts, Judge O’Scannlain concurred with the majority’s judgment that McGinest still presented a triable 
issue of material fact as to whether he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment, viewing the 
incidents from the perspective of a reasonable African-American.  Id. at 1133.  Judge O’Scannlain, 
however, dissented with the majority’s analysis and judgment of McGinest’s claim for failure to 
promote based on race, stating he would affirm the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of that 
claim.  Id. at 1136–41.  Finally, Judge O’Scannlain concurred with the majority’s decision to affirm 
summary judgment for the employer on the retaliatory failure to promote claim.  Id. at 1140–41. 
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workplace was hostile from the perspective of a reasonable African-
American employee, rather than from the judges’ own perspectives, 
leading them to conclude that the evidence demonstrated the existence 
of a racially hostile workplace.262  The majority ruled that “[f]or 
purposes of summary judgment, McGinest persuasively demonstrates 
that he was subjected to a hostile work environment.”263  This case, then, 
turned out differently at the trial level and on appeal.  Despite what 
should have been an easy and predictable outcome in light of the highly 
racist nature of the incidents, the district court judge still surprisingly got 
it wrong.  It was left to the federal appellate court to demonstrate the 
empathic consideration missing in the court’s analysis below, leading 
the appellate court to also infuse empathy into the reasonable person 
standard by making it more specific and relevant to the claim at issue, 
and accordingly reach a different decision.264  Although this case did not 
require the exercise of much empathy to reach the proper result, it also 
shows the harmful effect of an empathy-deficient approach when 
deciding even a mostly non-controversial employment discrimination 
matter.  And when deciding the harder cases, the degree of empathy 
used in adjudication may make an even greater difference.  
B. Ricci v. DeStefano (U.S. 2009)265 
A more difficult case can be found in Ricci, an employment 
discrimination case decided by the Supreme Court in a 5–4 decision.  A 
comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in Ricci provides 
examples of both partial judging and objective judging, based on the 
level of conscious empathy the Justices demonstrated in the opposing 
opinions.  Given that the Supreme Court is the final forum for appeal, it 
is all the more imperative that the Justices use empathy to render fair 
and objective decisions that will have lasting force. 
The facts in Ricci concern the promotion process for firefighters in 
the City of New Haven.266  In 2003, 118 firefighters seeking promotion 
 
 262. Judge O’Scannlain, although dissenting in part, also viewed McGinest’s allegations 
regarding the existence of a racially hostile work environment from the perspective of a reasonable 
African-American, stating that “the repeated invocation of highly offensive language in a variety of 
contexts may be understood to have created a humiliating atmosphere as seen from the objective 
perspective of a reasonable African-American.”  McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1133 (O’Scannlain, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 263. Id. at 1118 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 264. The dissent in McGinest, however, apparently viewed the facts surrounding McGinest’s 
hostile work environment race harassment claim as creating a “‘close case.’”  Id. at 1136 (O’Scannlain, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 265. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 266. Id. at 561–62. 
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in New Haven’s fire department took a qualifying exam.267  The 
candidates needed to meet certain criteria to be eligible to take the 
examination for promotion to either lieutenant or captain.268  The test for 
each position consisted of two parts: a written exam worth 60% and an 
oral exam worth 40% of a candidate’s overall score.269  The exam results 
were to be used to determine who would be considered for promotion 
over the following two-year period and the order in which the top-
scoring firefighters would be considered for promotion.270  Because the 
City of New Haven did not administer the promotion tests often, the 
exam results were very important for those who wished to be promoted 
in the near future.271  According to the results, white candidates 
performed better on the tests than the African-American and Hispanic 
candidates.272  Seventy-seven candidates sat for the lieutenant exam: 43 
whites, 19 blacks, and 15 Hispanics.273  Out of this pool, 34 candidates 
received passing scores: 25 whites, 6 blacks, and 3 Hispanics.274  
Translated into pass rates for each racial group, whites had a pass rate of 
58.1%, while blacks had a pass rate of 31.6% and Hispanics had a pass 
rate of 20%.275  Under the EEOC’s 80% standard, federal enforcement 
agencies generally find evidence of disparate impact if a group’s 
selection rate is less than 80% of the rate for the group with the highest 
selection rate, and the pass rates in Ricci for blacks and Hispanics were 
considerably below 80% of the pass rate for whites.276  Using the City’s 
“rule of three,”277 the 10 top-scoring candidates were eligible for instant 
promotion to lieutenant to fill 8 lieutenant spots available at the time, 
and these 10 candidates were all white.278  Additional vacancies would 
have permitted a minimum of 3 black candidates to be in the running for 
promotion to lieutenant.279  Regarding the captain exam, 41candidates 
sat for the test: 25 whites, 8 blacks, and 8 Hispanics.280  Out of this pool, 
22 candidates received passing scores: 16 whites, 3 blacks, and 3 
 
 267. Id. at 562.  
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 564. 
 270. Id. at 562. 
 271. Id.  
 272. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562.  
 273. Id. at 566. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 586. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Under this rule of three, the fire department must fill each vacancy by selecting one 
candidate from the three top-scoring candidates on the list.  Id. at 564. 
 278. Id. at 566. 
 279. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 566. 
 280. Id. 
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Hispanics.281  Putting this into pass rates, the pass rate for whites was 
64%, while the pass rates for blacks and Hispanics were both 37.5%.282  
Therefore, the pass rates for the minority groups on the captain exam 
also fell below the EEOC’s 80% standard.283  Again using the rule of 
three, 9 of these candidates were eligible for instant promotion to 
captain to fill 7 available spots: 7 whites and 2 Hispanics.284 
After a contentious public debate regarding whether to keep the test 
results, the City of New Haven decided to do away with them.285  
Thereafter 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter, who likely 
would have been promoted based on their strong exam performance, 
brought suit against the City of New Haven and some of the City’s 
officials, alleging that the City and its officials by discarding the exam 
results intentionally discriminated against them based on race in 
violation of both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment.286  In defense of their actions, the City and its officials 
asserted that if they had certified the results, they would have risked 
disparate impact liability under Title VII, given that minority firefighters 
performed disproportionately worse on the exam.287  This case thus 
involved claims of disparate treatment discrimination and disparate 
impact discrimination, both of which are unlawful under Title VII.   
The district court found in favor of the City and city officials on 
summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed.288  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City’s action 
in discarding the test results was race-based, and that under Title VII 
such race-based action is prohibited unless the City could show a strong 
basis in evidence that, had it not taken this action, it would have been 
liable for disparate impact discrimination.289  The Court believed that the 
strong-basis-in-evidence standard used in assessing claims of 
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause should be further employed in the Title VII context as this 
standard would ensure that the statute’s disparate treatment and 
disparate impact provisions are both enforced.290  Specifically, this 
standard would permit an infringement on one provision in order to 
 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 586. 
 283. Id. at 586–87. 
 284. Id. at 565. 
 285. Id. at 562. 
 286. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562–63. 
 287. Id. at 563. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 582–83. 
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uphold the other only in confined situations.291  As the Court explained:   
The standard leaves ample room for employers’ voluntary compliance 
efforts, which are essential to the statutory scheme and to Congress’s 
efforts to eradicate workplace discrimination.  And the standard 
appropriately constrains employers’ discretion in making race-based 
decisions: It limits that discretion to cases in which there is a strong basis 
in evidence of disparate-impact liability, but it is not so restrictive that it 
allows employers to act only when there is a provable, actual violation.292 
Since the case was decided under Title VII, the Court found that it was 
unnecessary to address the question under the Equal Protection 
Clause.293   
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief 
Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and 
Samuel Alito.294  In their analysis, they considered the process by which 
the exam was prepared by the New Haven Civil Service Board, the 
City’s certifying authority,295 as well as the views of various witnesses 
concerning the test.296  While stating that “[m]any firefighters studied 
for months, at considerable personal and financial cost,”297 the majority 
gave a more detailed account of the white firefighters’ situation, 
focusing on the experience of Frank Ricci, the named plaintiff and a 
white firefighter, explaining that he had “‘several learning disabilities,’ 
including dyslexia,” “had spent more than $1,000 to purchase the 
materials and pay his neighbor to read them on tape so he could ‘give it 
[his] best shot,’” and “had studied ‘8 to 13 hours a day to prepare’ for 
the test.”298  The majority further quoted Ricci’s statement to the City’s 
certifying authority: “‘I don’t even know if I made it . . . [b]ut the people 
who passed should be promoted.  When your life’s on the line, second 
best may not be good enough.’”299   
The majority provided little reflection, however, on the views or 
 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 583 (citations omitted). 
 293. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563. 
 294. Id. at 560.  Justice Scalia wrote separately, joining the Court’s opinion in full but raising the 
unsettled question regarding whether, or to what extent, Title VII’s disparate impact provisions are 
consistent with the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 594–96 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
Justice Alito also wrote a concurrence, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, to point out that even if 
the Court were to adopt the “good cause” standard advocated by the dissent, a reasonable jury could 
nonetheless find that the City’s asserted reason for discarding the test results to avoid disparate impact 
liability was pretextual and that the City’s real reason was to appease a politically important racial 
constituency.  Id. at 596–97 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 295. Id. at 563–66 (majority opinion). 
 296. Id. at 570–72. 
 297. Id. at 562. 
 298. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 568.   
 299. Id. 
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circumstances of the minority firefighters who argued against certifying 
the exam results, briefly stating that these firefighters “described the test 
questions as outdated or not relevant to firefighting practices in New 
Haven” and “criticized the test materials, a full set of which cost about 
$500, for being too expensive and too long.”300  Unlike with white 
plaintiff Ricci, the Court did not offer any personal details about any of 
the minority firefighters for whom the materials were too costly or 
difficult.  Instead, the majority included only a non-personal quote by 
one nonwhite firefighter, who stated that the source materials for the test 
“‘came out of New York . . . .  Their makeup of their city and everything 
is totally different than ours.’”301  
Based on the majority decision, these five Justices appeared to have 
more easily empathized with the white firefighters—delving specifically 
into the life story of one white firefighter, a sympathetic figure due to 
his learning challenges, while not taking the same step to explore the life 
story or experience of any of the minority firefighters.  The Court 
understood that “some of the firefighters here invested substantial time, 
money, and personal commitment in preparing for the tests”302 but 
primarily considered this from the perspective of the white firefighters 
who “saw their efforts invalidated by the City in sole reliance upon race-
based statistics.”303  The Court did not demonstrate an equal level of 
consideration concerning the efforts and aspirations of the minority 
firefighters, who also faced challenges in preparing for the exams and 
saw that their efforts would not help them pass an exam on which they 
disproportionately performed worse as a racial group.  The majority 
Justices seemed to unconsciously or automatically empathize with the 
white firefighters—the party more familiar and similar to the Justices in 
terms of race—but did not demonstrate the same degree of empathy for 
the minority firefighters, with whom the majority of the Justices did not 
readily identify.304  Because this case involved disappointing and 
 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id.  
 302. Id. at 58–84. 
 303. Id. at 584.  Justice Alito in his concurrence also only discussed the sacrifices that the plaintiff 
firefighters made to prepare for the tests, describing the efforts of petitioner Frank Ricci, a white 
firefighter, and petitioner Benjamin Vargas, a Hispanic firefighter.  Id. at 607 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 304. See WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 85–86 (in discussing the Supreme Court’s 
other affirmative action cases involving white plaintiffs, noting that the Court “attended with care to the 
needs, concerns, and particularly the ‘guiltlessness’ of the (white) litigants before it” but did not provide 
the same level of care to the needs and concerns of racial and ethnic minorities whom the Court’s 
decision also affects).  As West points out, even judges who support affirmative action can find it hard 
to not strongly empathize with guiltless white litigants: 
Judge Sokorow, a liberal compassionate, fair-minded judge who is unquestionably a friend of 
affirmative action, once remarked that the only qualms he had about affirmative action programs 
stemmed from the intensely personal difficulty he had facing an essentially “blameless” white 
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frustrating results for all of the firefighters who worked hard to succeed 
on the exam, resolving the dispute depended heavily on a contextual 
understanding of Title VII’s provisions and purposes and the extent to 
which judicial empathy was used to see both sides of the dispute.305  
That Justice Kennedy and his colleagues in the majority viewed the 
City’s action in trying to avoid a disparate-impact violation as though 
the City were directly engaging in disparate treatment discrimination, 
without a viable defense,306 tellingly indicates that they empathetically 
sided with the white firefighters who wanted the test results certified.  
The Court’s decision therefore fails to uphold judicial impartiality and 
actually reflects judicial bias.  As Robin West has cogently asserted in 
her examination of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in other 
affirmative action cases:  
What is fatal to the Court’s attempt to do justice in the affirmative action 
cases, is not so much an excess of particularity—an undue regard for the 
dilemma of blameless whites—as its coupling of that particularized 
solicitude with its steadfast refusal to take up the substantive task . . . to 
determine whether the ‘downside’ advantage enjoyed by the one side is 
causally related to the ‘upside’ disadvantage suffered by the other . . . .307 
It is further relevant to consider the identities of the actual parties in 
Ricci.  The white firefighters brought suit against the City of New 
Haven and certain city officials, but the black firefighters were not 
parties in the case at all.  Had the black firefighters joined the case as 
intervenors, they could have presented their experiences and 
perspectives concerning the exams and lack of promotion directly to the 
 
litigant, and denying the litigant his or her “place” in an apprenticeship program or applicant 
pool, so as to make space for a minority competitor.  
Id. at 85. 
 305. Arguably, the evidence that Justice Alito details in his concurrence regarding the racial strife 
that existed in the City of New Haven both before and during the events in this case provides a difficult 
backdrop against which to assess the perspectives and motives of the parties, and further complicates the 
analysis.  See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 597–606.  Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, however, points out that the 
evidence presented by Justice Alito relies heavily on the petitioner-firefighters’ statement of facts and 
places too much emphasis on the influence of certain actors, while giving too little recognition to the 
certifying authority’s reasons for reaching its decision to discard the test results.  Id. at 638–43 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Nonetheless, Justice Ginsburg argues that the racial politics in New Haven 
matters little in light of tests that appear to be flawed, given that better selection methods were available 
and used in other cities.  Id. at 609 n.1.  The question she raised was, “Why did such racially skewed 
results occur in New Haven, when better tests likely would have produced less disproportionate 
results?” Id.  
 306. Id. at 579. 
 307. WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 86 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in University of California v. Bakke, Croson v. City of Richmond, and Adarand Constructors Inc. v. 
Pena).  See also Rebecca K. Lee, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: Promoting Full Judicial 
Review and Process in Applying Strict Scrutiny, 4 HOUS. L. REV. HLRe 33 (2013) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s latest decision on affirmative action in university admissions). 
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Court.  Given that they did not intervene, however, the City nonetheless 
could have highlighted the black firefighters’ situations as further 
support for its defense and to more effectively display the other side of 
the story in response to the white plaintiffs’ stories.  But the City did not 
quite take this approach, and the reasons for its litigation strategy are 
unclear.308  Whether intentional or not, the missing voices of the black 
firefighters could have made a difference in understanding the stakes in 
the case.  To fully understand the exam results’ disparate and deleterious 
impact on the minority firefighters, the Court needed to understand these 
firefighters’ experiences, just as they needed to understand the particular 
context of the firefighting industry in New Haven and the City’s 
demographics. 
The majority opinion in Ricci is not the only instance in which 
Justices on the Supreme Court have selectively used empathy in 
deciding cases.  Justice Scalia for example, who was in the majority in 
Ricci, strongly empathized with a white male plaintiff in another Title 
VII employment discrimination case, Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
of Santa Clara County, California.309  In Johnson, plaintiff Paul Johnson 
alleged that his employer discriminated against him based on his sex in 
deciding to promote Diane Joyce over him for a road dispatcher 
position.310  The Supreme Court, however, found that the employer did 
not violate Title VII by considering gender in making its promotion 
decision pursuant to an affirmative action plan.311  Diane Joyce was not 
a party in the case, but the county employer in its merits brief provided 
details about her situation and perspective as they pertained to her 
application for the promotion at issue, noting: 
Joyce believed that the interviewers on the second oral interview panel 
would not give her fair consideration.  Her past experience with members 
of the panel led her to believe they were biased against her because of her 
sex.  Previously, Joyce had filed a grievance against one of the panelists, 
James Baldanzi, because he repeatedly denied her requests for protective 
work clothing, although he routinely issued such clothing to male 
employees.  Joyce sat on a safety committee with another member of the 
 
 308. See generally Respondents’ Brief on the Merits, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) 
(Nos. 07-1428, 08-328), 2009 WL 740763.  It may be that the City did not bring the stories of the black 
firefighters to the fore because it was concerned about appearing to favor blacks and subjecting itself to 
the critique Justice Alito made in his concurrence.  See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 597–606.  At the same time, 
the City could have maintained a sense of neutrality by highlighting these firefighters’ stories to present 
them as likely victims of disparate impact discrimination and the City’s resulting need to obey the law.  
In any event, the party structure in Ricci demonstrates the conflict of interests that may exist between the 
interests of the employer and the interests of the employees the employer seeks to protect. 
 309. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
 310. Id. at 625. 
 311. Id. at 641–42. 
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panel, Glenn Foreman, and Joyce believed his continuous disagreements 
with her reflected his bias against her because of her sex.  Joyce’s 
concerns about this bias increased when the second oral interview was 
scheduled exactly at a time during which, as she had previously notified 
the Superintendent, she had planned to attend a work-related class. . . .   
 
The second oral board recommended that Petitioner Johnson be hired.  
Baldanzi testified that he regarded Joyce as a “rebel rousing, skirtwearing 
person,” and “not a lady.” 
 
Joyce called the County’s Affirmative Action Office to express her 
concern that she might not be receiving fair consideration for the job.  In 
addition to her misgivings about possible bias on the second panel, Joyce 
was concerned as a result of past experiences which she believed were 
discriminatory.312   
These facts as well as others from the county employer’s brief, 
demonstrating that Diane Joyce was not less qualified than Paul Johnson 
and actually had suffered much discrimination during her tenure with 
the county agency, made their way into the Court’s majority opinion.313  
Justice Scalia, dissenting in this case however, lamented that “the only 
losers in the process are the Johnsons of the country, for whom Title VII 
has been not merely repealed but actually inverted.  The irony is that 
these individuals—predominately unknown, unaffluent, and 
unorganized—suffer this injustice at the hands of a Court fond of 
thinking itself the champion of the politically impotent.”314  Justice 
Scalia easily empathized with Johnson, a white male, but did not make 
the extra effort to empathetically imagine the position of Joyce as the 
lone woman on the road crew job, who persevered despite ongoing 
harassment to qualify for the promotion to become a road dispatcher.315  
This is evident in his dissenting opinion, in which he discusses 
Johnson’s endeavors and hopes on the job but fails to examine at all 
Joyce’s work experiences and goals.316  Like the majority opinion in 
Ricci, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Johnson shows that Supreme Court 
Justices also have tended to immerse themselves in the stories of those 
with whom they share something in common, neglecting to expressly do 
the same for those who appear more different.317  But unlike in Ricci, the 
 
 312. Brief of Respondent, Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616 
(1987) (No. 85-1129), 1986 WL 728165, at *6–8 (citations omitted). 
 313. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 623–25, 638. 
 314. Id. at 677. Justice Scalia’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice 
Byron White. 
 315. See Minow, supra note 64, at 49–50 (making a similar point about Justice Scalia’s sympathy 
for Johnson and lack of sympathy for Joyce in his dissent in this case). 
 316. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 661–62 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 317. See Bandes, Why is Empathy Controversial?, supra note 161. 
52
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/4
2013] JUDGING JUDGES 197 
respondent employer in Johnson brought forward Diane Joyce’s story 
for the Court to consider, given the relevance of her situation even if she 
was not a party in the case.  
The dissent in Ricci, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Stephen 
Breyer,318 nonetheless offers an example of judicial empathy deployed 
in conscious fashion.  Although Justice Ginsburg, like the majority, 
noted that the high-scoring white firefighters “attract the Court’s 
sympathy,”319 she did not stop there but included the other side of the 
story, making more effort to understand the effect of the Court’s 
decision in the specific context of the City of New Haven, where the 
population consisted of more African-Americans and Hispanics than 
whites, and where the fire department had historically had very few 
racial and ethnic minorities in command posts.320  She expressly took 
into account the context of the dispute, recognizing that Title VII was 
expanded by Congress in 1972 to cover state and local government 
employers to precisely address the rampant discrimination by 
municipalities against minorities in the firefighting industry.321  Stating 
that the majority decision “leaves out important parts of the story,”322 
Ginsburg understood that a contextualized and evenhanded factual 
inquiry was needed to properly evaluate the dispute.  She gave careful 
attention to the experience of the minority firefighters, many of whom 
were “first-generation firefighters” who did not have easy or equal 
access to the study materials and did not have family or friends in the 
firefighting profession who could help them prepare for the exam.323  
She showed that she could be affected by the white firefighters’ 
situation but still rule for the other side after considering the factual 
circumstances of both parties in light of the law.324  In also considering 
Title VII’s full purposes and its case law, as well as Congress’s intent in 
codifying the disparate impact provision, Ginsburg believed that a good 
cause standard, rather than the strong-basis-in-evidence standard, was 
the correct one to apply: “an employer who jettisons a selection device 
when its disproportionate racial impact becomes apparent does not 
violate Title VII’s disparate-treatment bar automatically or at all, subject 
 
 318. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 608 (2009). 
 319. Id. Justice Ginsburg also noted that the good cause standard is supported by the EEOC’s 
interpretive guidelines on Title VII compliance.  Id. at 262. 
 320. Id. at 609. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 613–14. 
 324. See Minow, supra note 64, at 90–91 (explaining that competing views should not paralyze 
decisionmaking because judges can understand and be moved by a litigant’s story and still decide to 
deny his or her claim). 
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to this key condition: The employer must have good cause to believe the 
device would not withstand examination for business necessity.”325  
Regarding whether the City and its officials satisfied this good cause 
standard, Justice Ginsburg stated she would remand the case for further 
proceedings rather than decide the case on summary judgment.326  But if 
final judgment at this stage is proper, then she concluded that the City 
met this standard and did not engage in disparate treatment 
discrimination in violation of Title VII.327   
Justice Ginsburg demonstrated in her Ricci dissent how a different 
result may be reached when judges engage in a conscious form of 
perspective-taking to better understand the experiences of the 
traditionally less privileged party, and the ramifications of the court’s 
decision for both sides.  By considering the fuller story of the minority 
firefighters within the broader setting of the firefighting industry, Justice 
Ginsburg attempted to see their position from their perspectives and 
circumstances, providing an analysis that was missing from the majority 
opinion.  Although Justice Ginsburg and her dissenting colleagues could 
have offered more discussion on the white firefighters’ efforts and 
perspectives, the majority opinion in any event supplied those details.  
By being attentive to the facts on the other side and attentive to the 
proper context for those facts understood through an empathetic lens, 
she engaged in a more overall balanced analysis, giving us a better 
example of judging and a better result with the goal of true impartiality.  
V. UPHOLDING IMPARTIALITY IN JUDGING: PROPOSALS TO REQUIRE 
EMPATHY IN THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS 
To support impartial outcomes, several steps can be taken to better 
infuse judicial decisionmaking with an empathetic process of review.  
The following set of proposals address adjudication with respect to 
employment discrimination cases and also offer ways in which to 
encourage and prepare judges to expand and use their empathetic skills 
more broadly when deciding cases.   
A. Adopting a New Reasonable Person and Reasonableness Standard 
for Hostile Work Environment Discrimination Cases 
As shown earlier, discrimination cases alleging a hostile work 
environment by definition involve a difference of perspective due to 
individual characteristics protected under the law, such as race, color, 
 
 325. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 625–26. 
 326. Id. at 630–31. 
 327. Id. at 632. 
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sex, national origin, and religion.328  To ensure that judges carefully and 
empathetically consider the perspective of the party alleging harm and 
other germane factors when deciding a case involving hostile work 
environment under Title VII, courts should adopt a legal standard that 
clearly expresses this goal, building upon the Ninth Circuit’s approach 
in Ellison and McGinest.  Furthermore, the Ellison and McGinest 
standard should be extended to cover all hostile environment 
discrimination claims, so that these claims would be evaluated from the 
perspective of a reasonable person of the same subordinated group (e.g., 
the same gender or racial or ethnic group) as the plaintiff in the 
plaintiff’s position.  This standard should also be broadened to include 
consideration of other factors that inform whether the plaintiff’s reaction 
was reasonable, including other relevant aspects of the plaintiff’s 
identity and experiences, circumstances surrounding the harassment 
taking place at work (and outside of the work space if appropriate), and 
the workplace culture and context.329  As Ann McGinley has argued, 
In determining the proper objective standard for a hostile working 
environment, it is important to assure that we do not use men as a 
measuring stick of how a reasonable person would react, and that we do 
not engage in stereotyping when determining how men and women 
should or do react to a harassing environment.  To avoid these problems, 
the law should allow fact-finders to consider variations in the context of 
the workplace, it should take into account different lived experiences of 
the victims, and it should reflect on power differentials at work and in 
society.  But, most importantly, a new standard should recognize that 
there is a range of reasonable responses to the same set of behaviors.330 
To determine whether the alleged behavior was objectively hostile, 
the legal standard should consider the reasonable perspective of 
someone who shares the party’s identity that is the basis of the 
discrimination claim, along with the plaintiff’s other characteristics as 
well as circumstances that shape her or his response to the harassment.  
This approach is needed for the analysis itself to be objective—that is, 
for the adjudicators to avoid making biased judgments, particularly 
when they may find it easier to, or automatically, empathize with a 
 
 328. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) (also known as “Title VII”).  See also McGinest v. GTE Serv. 
Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (stating that to prevail on a Title VII hostile work environment claim, the 
plaintiff must both objectively and subjectively show that the alleged behavior negatively affected one’s 
work conditions).  See also discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 329. See Ann C. McGinley, Reasonable Men?, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2012) (arguing for a 
new objective standard for hostile work environment harassment claims under Title VII that focuses on 
whether the plaintiff’s response was a reasonable one based on various factors, including the workplace 
dynamics, the harassing behaviors, and the plaintiff’s identity, experiences, and position at the 
workplace). 
 330. Id. at 34. 
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white male plaintiff, but not with a female or minority plaintiff.331  
Further, by taking into account other aspects of a plaintiff’s identity as 
well as life experiences that also inform a particular plaintiff’s response, 
such an approach would lessen the likelihood of enforcing a stereotyped 
or essentialized expectation regarding how a given plaintiff would react.  
As intersectionality theory332 and masculinities theory333 have shown, 
individuals’ identities and behaviors are shaped by multiple influences 
and intertwined experiences, and thus a simplified model of the 
“reasonable person” cannot serve as an accurate guide for a plaintiff’s 
reasonable response without also considering other relevant factors.  
Discrimination claims, which focus on the protected aspect(s) of a 
person’s identity rather than on the person’s entire identity, already 
present a risk that courts will engage in some degree of essentializing by 
considering the protected trait(s) in a rather isolated way.  To mitigate 
this risk, the objective standard ought to be revised to require a more 
individualized assessment of the plaintiff’s response based on the 
plaintiff’s protected trait and in light of the plaintiff’s broader identity 
and the circumstances surrounding the harassment.  In addition, having a 
more diversified bench, and more diverse law clerks to advise judges, 
would provide a wider range of perspectives concerning what may be 
seen as a reasonable reaction by a plaintiff in a harassment case.  
The Supreme Court’s decisions offer some precedent for the use of 
this type of objective and individualized standard when deciding 
workplace discrimination cases.  For instance, in Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, which involved a hostile environment sex harassment 
claim, the Supreme Court stressed that “the objective severity of 
harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable 
person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the circumstances.’”334  
 
 331. The reasonable person standard has been critiqued in the criminal law context as well, in 
light of racial and gender dynamics and norms that contribute to juror bias.  See generally CAROLINE A. 
FORELL AND DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE 
OF MAN (2000) (arguing for a reasonable woman standard in all cases implicating gender, such as in 
cases involving hostile environment sex harassment, stalking, domestic homicide, and rape); CYNTHIA 
LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 204–07, 221–25 (2003) (examining the reasonable person 
standard in criminal law cases and arguing that in cases implicating masculine and heterosexual norms, 
jurors should engage in gender- and sexual-orientation switching (switching the gender or sexual 
orientation of the reasonable person in applying the reasonableness standard as part of the jury 
instruction) and in cases implicating race, jurors should engage in race-switching). 
 332. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 
U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 139 (1989). 
 333. See McGinley, supra note 329, at 18–20 (explaining that masculinities theory looks at the 
normative nature of certain masculine conduct and how masculine expectations harm both men and 
women, and can be further examined through a multidimensional lens as masculinities combine with 
race, sexual orientation, class, and gender, depending on the context). 
 334. 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
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The Supreme Court thus has recognized that an objective evaluation of a 
harassment or discrimination claim requires an understanding of the 
plaintiff’s perspective and the circumstances that shape it, although the 
Court frames this perspective as simply that of a reasonable person in 
the plaintiff’s shoes.  In light of the existing legal standard, it seems the 
use of empathy in adjudication is actually already embedded in the law 
to some extent.  The applicability of empathy should be drawn out 
explicitly, however, to ensure that it is recognized under its proper name 
as a judicial principle that goes hand in hand with impartial judging.  By 
modifying the test to make clear that “the perspective of a reasonable 
person in the plaintiff’s position” is that of someone who shares the 
plaintiff’s protected characteristic which is the basis for the plaintiff’s 
claim, while still taking into account the totality of the circumstances, 
the standard would better require judges to see things using an 
empathetic stance.  To understand the litigants’ claims, judges must try 
to empathize with the parties, especially with plaintiffs who differ from 
the adjudicator in some aspect relevant to the case.  Empathetic inquiry 
and deliberation are necessary if impartial judging is the goal. 
B. Articulating Judicial Decisions Through Full Written Opinions that 
Consider All Perspectives 
Although we look to judicial opinions to understand a judge’s 
reasoning for their decisions, federal judges increasingly have been 
writing fewer full opinions as their dockets have ballooned in size.335  
Moreover, judges in recent times often decide cases via unpublished 
opinions, which are less complete and not citable, or issue decisions by 
brief orders.336  This kind of judicial efficiency, however, undermines 
judging as a deliberate process that requires careful writing as well as 
thinking, and frustrates the expectation that judges will explain and 
convince others of their judgment.337   
As a result, judges should be required to write a full written opinion 
when rendering a decision on the merits of a case.338  In their written 
decisions, judges should show how they considered all sides to the 
dispute, and aim for objectivity by demonstrating how they engaged in a 
 
 335. See Wald, supra note 63, at 904.  
 336. Id. 
 337. See id. (noting that “the discipline of writing an opinion to persuade ‘intelligent outsiders,’ or 
even a higher court, no longer applies in about half of all federal appellate cases” and that “careful 
research, arduous rewriting, and open dialogue . . . inhibits idiosyncratic or overadventurous rulings”). 
 338. See Steven Semararo, A Reasoning-Process Review Model for Federal Habeas Corpus, 94 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 897, 927–30 (2004) (making a similar point in arguing for thoroughly 
reasoned decisions by state courts in the federal habeas context, to ensure that state courts take full 
account of the relevant federal law to receive deference by the habeas court on federal review). 
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process of conscious empathizing with those who have less power and 
are less like them—those who tend to be more easily dismissed.  
Requiring such written discussion as part of published decisions would 
better ensure that judges do not submit to or act on implicit or 
unconscious biases.339  The task of judging comes with the responsibility 
to fully explain one’s rulings, and this duty should not be sacrificed in 
order to quickly dispose of a case.  But in light of the reality of 
mounting judicial caseloads and the resulting decrease in time available 
for each case, it would help to explore ways in which to make the 
workloads of judges more manageable, such as making judicial system-
wide changes that would provide judges with more time to render 
decisions.340   
Moreover, while deliberating and drafting, judges can test how they 
view and understand a case through dialogue with other judges who may 
view things differently.341  As Circuit Judge Patricia M. Wald has 
explained, “colleagues do serve as an important brake on an individual 
judge’s own predilections.  On the court of appeals it takes at least two 
judges to reach a panel decision; a dissenter can provoke serious second 
thoughts and consequent modifications in a draft opinion.”342  Judges 
care about what other judges think because their colleagues’ agreement 
or dissent is often the only type of concrete feedback they receive 
concerning their work.343  In addition, judicial norms and collegiality-
based factors, as well as strategic considerations, also limit the latitude 
that individual judges may take.344  But this type of deliberation will not 
work well unless judges are willing to truly reflect on their own 
positions rather than merely defend them.  We have seen, for instance, 
that appellate judges do not always display understanding of the other 
side’s perspective when writing their majority opinions and dissents, 
separate from their ultimate stance regarding how a case should be 
decided.345  
 
 339. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How 
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2007) (“…the discipline of opinion writing might 
enable well-meaning judges to overcome their intuitive, impressionistic reactions” and “[t]he process of 
writing might challenge the judge to assess a decision more carefully, logically, and deductively”). 
 340. Id. at 35. 
 341. Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 57, at 146. 
 342. Wald, supra note 63, at 906. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. at 905 (referring to Professor Lon Fuller’s comment regarding judges’ “‘mutually 
advantageous relations of reciprocity’” as well as the following informal judicial norms identified by 
Judge Harry Edwards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: “the tradition, when 
views on the panel diverge, of reaching out for consensus to avoid split decisions; the etiquette of 
circulating and commenting on proposed opinions throughout the court; the oral argument and 
conferencing that involve judges alone”). 
 345. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (Scalia, 
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Although trial judges, who do not decide cases as part of a panel, lack 
the same opportunity as their appellate counterparts to discuss and 
debate their views with judicial colleagues, they can nonetheless test 
their views with their judicial clerks, who work closely with them on 
cases.  Similar to the value of having diverse decisionmakers on the 
bench, judges should seek diverse clerks with varied backgrounds to 
help provide different perspectives when reviewing a case.   
Ultimately, the decisionmaking of all judges, both trial and appellate, 
state and federal, would improve if in their opinions they were expected 
to fully articulate the facts so as to convey an understanding of all sides, 
rather than only state the facts from the perspective of the prevailing 
party.  Judges ought to demonstrate the degree to which they have 
attempted to empathize with each litigant’s story.  For legal decisions to 
be fair and objective, they should communicate more than the legal 
rationales for the judgment; they should also describe the human stories 
that must be first understood in order to properly apply the legal rules to 
the specific facts.  There can be no careful application of the rules 
without a careful probing of the facts, and an incomplete or a partial 
factual foundation will only provide support for a likewise weak and 
partial legal analysis.   
C. Encouraging Judicial Dialogue, Information-Sharing, and 
Empathetic Decisionmaking Through Judicial Programs 
Since judges at both the state and federal levels participate in and help 
design professional education programs specifically geared for them 
regarding their judicial work and duties,346  these programs could 
include sessions on how to strive for impartial judging using an 
empathetic approach.347  Case examples and analysis of sample court 
opinions can be used and studies shared demonstrating differences in 
outcomes depending on the judges’ experiences and backgrounds and 
their level of engagement with the parties’ stories.  Exercises can also be 
offered in which judges try to understand another’s views and 
experiences.  Such exercises can incorporate excerpts from novels, short 
stories, and memoirs to explore the contextualized thoughts and 
 
J., dissenting).  See also discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 346. See, e.g., State-Federal Judicial Education Programs, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/fsje/home.nsf; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial.html. 
 347. See Decety & Jackson, supra note 27, at 94 (noting that empathy is “a flexible human 
capacity as well as a method of gaining knowledge of understanding another” and that empathy “is 
susceptible to social-cognitive intervention, such as through training or enhancement programs for 
targeting various goals”); Rachlinski et al, supra note 58, at 1228 (asserting that both new and sitting 
judges can significantly benefit from judicial training on the risks of implicit biases in decisionmaking).   
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emotions of someone different from the judges.  This dialogue and 
learning can mimic the type of back-and-forth that takes place between 
judges on appellate panels when deciding cases, and can be useful to 
trial judges who do not have the same opportunities for debate with 
colleagues when hearing cases.  Rather than make attendance at such 
training programs mandatory, these sessions can be offered at widely-
attended judicial conferences and events.348  Additionally, taking into 
account insights from behavioral economics when trying to bring about 
behavioral change, the way the message is framed can make a difference 
in either encouraging or discouraging certain behavior.349  For instance, 
when putting on such programs, it may be more effective to place the 
focus on empathetic decisionmaking as necessary for judical impartiality 
rather than to highlight unempathetic decisionmaking that is biased.350  
Similarly, to encourage judges to see themselves as decisionmakers with 
the relevant characteristics, communicating a message to judicial 
audiences that “they are empathetic and impartial jurists” may prompt a 
better change in approach than only suggesting that “they can be more 
empathetic as judges.”351  Finally, providing voluntary testing 
opportunities that would allow judges to receive direct feedback on their 
levels of empathic effort when understanding different factual scenarios 
may aid in further motivating them to modify their decisionmaking 
approach.352 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The political controversy over the use of empathy in judging, sparked 
by President Obama’s commentary on the desired attributes in a judicial 
nominee, provided an important occasion to consider the role of the 
judge as well as the process of judging to achieve both the actuality and 
appearance of an impartial stance.  But the public discussion, rather than 
enlightening became muddled, as politicians and commentators who 
argued that judicial empathy would lead to favoritism for one side failed 
 
 348. See SCHAFRAN & WIKLER, supra note 72, at 30.  
 349. See Robert O’Neill, Thinking Big in Small Ways: The Importance of How We Make 
Decisions, Harvard Kennedy School Magazine, Winter 2013, at 24–28 (explaining lessons learned from 
behavioral economics and decision science research to help people make better decisions). 
 350. See id. (describing the example of getting more people to vote by using certain 
“experimentally validated behavioral interventions such as emphasizing high turnout rather than low 
turnout”). 
 351. See id. (providing the example of how to encourage more people to vote and finding that 
“emphasizing the identity that ‘you are a voter’ rather than ‘you can vote’” is more effective). 
 352. See Rachlinski et al, supra note 58, at 1228 (noting that judicial training currently does not 
include any testing of a judge’s vulnerability to implicit bias, and that this is a problem in getting judges 
to fully appreciate the harms of such bias). 
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to see the actual purpose of empathy in supporting judicial objectivity.  
This was a missed opportunity to explore how empathy supports judicial 
objectivity and fairness, concededly made difficult by the politics 
surrounding judicial appointments.  But the opportunity is not entirely 
lost.  What was seen as controversial can become well-accepted by 
reintroducing and reinvigorating the national dialogue on empathy’s role 
in upholding judicial impartiality.  It is time for an affirmative case for 
empathy to be made.  To pick up where President Obama left off, the 
concept of empathy as a way of understanding different perspectives 
must be clarified and its necessary importance for judicial impartiality 
and for judicial selection expressly asserted.  
Empathy, as used in this Article, refers to the action of taking the 
perspective of another by conceptually placing oneself in another’s 
position—to better understand what the other person is thinking and 
feeling.  Empathy encourages both cognitive and emotional 
understanding of others with different experiences, identities, and 
worldviews.  It entails attempting to better understand all sides to a 
dispute, with care taken to understand the side with less power and less 
similarity vis-à-vis the adjudicator, to ensure that all sides are given full 
consideration.  Empathy matters for judging because judges must 
expressly and consciously take into account the full positions of the 
parties, from where the parties stand, to avoid making unconscious and 
biased judgments.  This is particularly important in cases where the 
judges are differently situated from the parties in terms of life 
opportunities and societal expectations.  Impartial decisionmaking 
requires that judges attempt to carefully understand the experiences and 
perspectives of the parties who come before them (while also 
considering how future parties may be affected), paying more care to 
members of traditionally-subordinated groups whose views are less 
commonly heard and understood.353  Such individuals, for instance, 
typically are involved in lawsuits involving some sort of alleged 
discrimination or unequal treatment.  Since the bulk of discrimination 
lawsuits end at the summary judgment stage and hence never make it to 
trial, judges commonly serve as the only audience who hear and decide 
these cases, rendering it critically important that they make an effort to 
envision the litigants’ stories and bring into view a fuller picture of what 
is at stake in a given case. 
If the parties are to have their day in court and expect an impartial 
process, they must be heard with equal consideration.  When presented 
with different stories in a case, which, based on the evidence, are 
 
 353. See Colby, supra note 8, at 1998–99 (also making the argument that judges need to be able to 
see a given dispute from the perspectives of all of the parties, but without a full emphasis on having 
judges particularly attend to the views of those with traditionally less power). 
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different versions of reality as experienced by the disputants, it is 
imperative for judges to sort through these stories by adopting each of 
the disputant’s perspectives for an impartial view of the facts.  This 
includes empathetically trying to understand the disputants’ individual 
and situational differences, and wrestling with such differences the 
greater they are.354 
This Article makes various recommendations to better bring empathy 
into the adjudication process at various stages—at the judicial 
nomination and confirmation stages, the case hearing stage, the rule-
making stage, the opinion-writing stage, and the professional training 
stage.  All of these proposals can be implemented by judges and by 
those who select them and confirm them.  In recognizing empathy’s 
necessary role in impartial decisionmaking, the public should be 
concerned not when judicial empathy is used, but when it is absent or 
deficient. 
 
 354. See Minow, supra note 64, at 17 (asserting that “our common humanity wins when the Court 
struggles with our differences” and making this point about cases where the Supreme Court engaged and 
struggled with multiple views of reality). 
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